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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

TRACY MICHAH ALLRED,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010113-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in a public park, an enhanced second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. §§
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii), (4) (Supp. 2000) (R3-5, 148). This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Can this Court review the pretrial ruling admitting defendant's post-Miranda}
confession, where the bulk of the evidence relied upon by the trial court at the
suppression hearing- -a transcript of the preliminary hearing- -is not part of the record
on appeal?

'See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1

Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing
court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f
17, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997); State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); J.V.
Hatch Constr. Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah App. 1998).
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion to deny defendant's motion
for mistrial?
A trial court's denial of a mistrial motion will not be reversed "[ujnless a review of
the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the
reviewing ] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). This deferential review is due to the
"advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in the
courtroom on the total proceedings[.]" Id. See also State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38,
993 P.2d 837 (reiterating Robertson standard).
3. Did the trial court properly exclude, as unreliable hearsay, evidence that a
defense witness heard another individual claim ownership of the black bag in an alleged
excited utterance, approximately one and one-half hours after defendant's confession and
arrest?

2

"The standard of review when considering the admissibility of out-of-court
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence depends on whether the trial court's analysis
involves a factual or legal determination or some combination thereof." State v. Parker,
2000 UT 5 1 ^ 13, 4 P-3d 778. Factual findings as to the nature, timing and reliability of
the statements are reviewed for clear error. Id. The trial court's ultimate determination
of admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000
UT App 188, f 9, 5 P.3d 1 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), for
abuse of discretion standard). But see Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244, f 8, 9
P.3d 769 (citing Pena but applying correctness standard).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2):
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript.
Utah R. Evid. 803(2):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: .. . Excited Utterance. A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in a public park, an enhanced second degree felony (R3-5).
Motion to Suppress Admissions. Defendant moved to suppress his pre- and postMiranda admissions (R32-35). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant called
one witness, Sonya Ortiz, and the State called none (Rl 88:3-16) (a complete copy of the
transcript is contained in addendum A).2 Both parties relied on testimony given at the
preliminary hearing (R188:3, 17-18, 20-45), add. A.3
Ruling on Motion to Suppress. The trial court ruled from the bench that
defendant's pre-Miranda admission was inadmissible, but took under advisement the
admissibility of the later warned statement (Rl 88:39-45), add. B. Thereafter, the trial
court ruled that defendant's second, warned statement was admissible (R189:l-4) (a copy
of the oral ruling is contained in addendum C). The trial court's written Findings of Fact

2

Although the transcript itself reflects a date of 1 September 2001 (see R188), the
corresponding minute entry reflects that the hearing was held on 5 September 2001(s££
R41-42).
3

The preliminary hearing was held on 11 July 2001 (R25-26). Although the
parties and the trial court had copies of the preliminary hearing transcript below, it is not
apparent on the record whether the copies were from an official or unofficial
transcription. In any event, defendant did not request that the preliminary hearing be
transcribed for purposes of appeal, nor did he designate the preliminary hearing as part of
the record on appeal (Rl 61-167) (copies of the pertinent documents are contained in
addendum B).
4

and Conclusions of Law were filed after trial on 15 February 2001 (R172-178) (a copy is
contained in addendum D).
Trial. Following a one-day jury trial on 12 September 2000, defendant was
convicted as charged (R148).
Sentence. On 5 January 2001, the trial court imposed the statutory term of from
one-to-fifteen-years, with credit for time served (R156-157).
Notice of Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R159).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Officers Dimond and Evans were patrolling Liberty Park looking for drug activity
on 9 June 2000, when they made contact with defendant and five other individuals sitting
on a picnic table near the basketball court (Rl90:125-127). As the officers approached
the group at the picnic table, defendant "made a quick movement down towards his
pocket and then turned and sat down on the table facing away [from the officers]"
(R190:128, 162). Officer Evans "walked up, asked them how they were doing, told them
about the problems that [he] had experienced in, around in [that] area of the park, that's
particularly the basketball courts," and asked the group if they had observed any drug
activity in the area (Rl90:130,163). All six responded negatively (R190:130). The
officers then asked for identification from the group and ran warrants checks (id.).
Finding no warrants, the officers did not plan to detain anyone (R190:131).

5

As the officers made ready to leave the area, they observed a black bag sitting by
the end of the bench, with no one sitting near it (R190:131, 164). None of the six
individuals claimed the bag, nor did anyone else in the immediate vicinity (R190:132,
164). When the officers looked inside for some identification they saw "some car
stereos," a couple baggies of marijuana, and approximately 82 empty baggies, sandwich
size and smaller, one-inch square size (R190:132, 164-165). The officers took each of the
six individuals aside individually and asked them again if the bag belonged to any one of
them (R190:146, 166, 177). All six again denied knowing anything about the black bag
(R190-.166, 178).
At this juncture the officers conferred with one another, in front of the group of
six, as to the advisability of bringing a drug dog to the scene, and which type (R190:147).
Specifically, there are two types of police dogs: Canines (German Shepherds) and
Bloodhounds (R190:154). The German Shepherds are used for tracking and for sniffing
drugs and "can be used to apprehend suspects if a person runs" (id.). However, German
Shepherds are "sometimes mean" (R190:179). "[T]hey're trained to play with drugs as a
toy and they think it's a toy and so when they locate . . . a drug they kind of start playing
with it like it's a toy, and that's how they indicate there's a drug there" (R190:179). The
officers discussed that a German Shepherd had once "nipped" someone's backside
because he had drugs stuffed there (R190:180).

6

Accordingly, Officer Dimond was concerned about bringing a German Shepherd
to the scene because "there's a possibility that they could get bit" (R190:148). Therefore,
the officers determined to bring the Bloodhound instead (R190:154-155). The
Bloodhound is "fairly new to [the] police department," and "is a very friendly dog. It's a
big Bloodhound like McGraw, and it's used to track. It can sniff people. You just give it
a small article of clothing and it can sniff exactly where that person's been, based on just
that one smell, and so it's used only to find people or, or things" (R190:154).
Following this discussion between the officers, but prior to the Bloodhound's
arrival, defendant volunteered that the black bag belonged to him (R190:155, 180).
Because the trial court made a pretrial ruling that defendant's pre-Miranda admission
was not admissible, the prosecutor asked broadly whether "at some point" the officers
had occasion to arrest defendant (R190:167). Officer Evans responded affirmatively and
indicated that after arresting defendant, he "told him he wanted to ask a few questions,
and asked defendant if he had ever been read his Miranda rights (id.). When defendant
responded affirmatively, the officer asked if he understood those rights and defendant
again responded affirmatively (id.). Thereafter, Officer Evans explained the Miranda
rights to defendant and defendant agreed to talk (id.). Specifically, defendant said that
the black bag and marijuana belonged to him, "that he had been selling marijuana for
approximately two months in the park" (R190:168).

7

In obtaining defendant's confession, Officer Evans at no time removed his gun
from his duty belt (R190:169). Moreover, defendant gave no indication that he was
fearful about the Bloodhound, which, in any event, was never let out of the police
vehicle in which it arrived (R190:170).
Defendant called one witness, Sonya Ortiz, who was one of the six people present
at the picnic table at the time of his arrest (R 190:271-304). According to Ortiz, another
individual,known to her only as "Clay," was present at the picnic table when the police
initially approached, but immediately left the area (Rl90:276, 281, 288). Clay came back
to the picnic table about one and one-half hours after defendant's arrest (R191:281, 286).
According to Ortiz, Clay was "angry," specifically, he was "yelling and swearing"
(Rl90:282, 287). Upon objection from the prosecutor, the trial court precluded Ortiz
from testifying that Clay stated, "The bag was mine. That stuff was mine" (Rl 90:296).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point L This Court cannot review the pretrial ruling admitting defendant's postMiranda confession where the bulk of the evidence relied upon by the trial court at the
suppression hearing-a transcript of the preliminary hearing-is not part of the record on
appeal. Given this circumstance, this Court should presume the regularity, or correctness,
of the trial court's ruling.
Point II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant's
motion for mistrial. First, defendant fails to demonstrate that the parties' pretrial

8

stipulation was violated by testimony that police also saw stereos in defendants black bag.
Even if the testimony violated the pretrial stipulation, any error in its admission was
harmless because defendant was not charged with stealing the stereos, and the jury was
not told of his admission regarding the stolen the stereos. Thus, given the incriminating
evidence that defendant claimed the marijuana in the bag and admitted selling it, a
reasonable jury would have convicted him for the drug crime with or without the
innocuous references to the stereos.
Second, any possible prejudice resulting from Officer Evans's reference to a prior
administration of Miranda rights was cured by the trial court's curative statement giving
the jury a neutral explanation for the reference. This Court generally presumes that a jury
will follow the instructions given it. Defendant does not claim and the record does not
indicate that the curative instruction was ineffective.
Point III. The trial court properly excluded, as unreliable hearsay, evidence that a
defense witness overheard another essentially unknown individual claim the black bag
approximately one and one/half hours after defendant's confession and arrest. The
declarant's "discovery" that the bag he earlier abandoned was missing does not amount to
the type of shocking or frightening event classically associated with the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, the circumstances of this case suggest that the
declarant, if he existed at all, reasonably anticipated that police may well seize the
abandoned bag and the contraband therein. Even if the exclusion was erroneous, it was

9

harmless in light of defendant's weightier confession that the bag and the marijuana
inside belonged to him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO INCLUDE IN THE
RECORD THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT UPON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT RELIED IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS POST MIRANDA ADMISSION, THIS
COURT MUST PRESUME THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED
CORRECTLY
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress his
post-Miranda admissions, claiming he was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Aplt. Br. at 15-28. Because the record on appeal does not
contain the preliminary hearing transcript upon which the trial court's ruling was based,
this Court must affirm.
In lieu of a full evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties opted to
rely on the preliminary hearing transcript (R188:3), add. A. Accordingly, only one
witness, Sonya Ortiz, testified at the abbreviated motion to suppress hearing (Rl 88:3-15),
add. A. Thereafter, the parties argued to the trial court, relying on evidence adduced at
the preliminary hearing, which the trial court had previously reviewed (R188:3, 16-18,
20-40), add. A. As the underlying facts were not otherwise adduced during the
suppression hearing, the trial court necessarily relied upon the preliminary hearing
transcript in making its factual findings which include the following:
10

34.

After each of the six people asked denied knowing to whom the bag
belonged the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves about
different ways in which they might determine the bag's owner.

35.

During that conversation, conducted within earshot of all six people, the
officers considered aloud whether they should call in a K-9 unit.

36.

As part of the discussion about the possibility of a K-9 unit, one of the
officers made a comment about some of the police dogs being meaner than
others.

37.

Officer Evans remarked that Salt Lake County had a dog that had nipped at
a suspects' backside because the dog had alerted on drugs located in the
suspect's pants.

38.

The officers never indicated to any person that a dog would bite them if
they turned out to be the owner of the bag.

39.

There was no police dog present at the scene during the conversation about
the dog.

40.

Defendant then indicated to Officer Dimond that the bag belonged to him.

41.

Defendant was then placed under arrest, and Officer Evans read defendant
his Miranda rights.

42.

Post-Miranda, defendant described to Officer Evans the contents of the
bag, and the origin of those items. He indicated, among other things, that
the green leafy substance inside the bag was marijuana and that he had been
selling marijuana because he could not get a job.

43.

Sometime around the time that defendant was arrested, Officer Serio
arrived at the scene with a police dog.

44.

Officer Serio was driving a marked Salt Lake City Police car that did not
bear any markings identifying it as a K-9 unit.

(R176-177),add.D.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded:
11

1.

Defendant's initial statement to Officer Dimond, in which defendant
admitted to ownership of the black bag, was made without benefit of the
Miranda warnings, and is thus admissible at trial.

2.

However, defendant's initial statement admitting ownership, while violative
of Miranda, was made voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. In
the absence of such coercion on the part of law enforcement, there is no
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
"fruit of the poison tree" doctrine does not apply.

3.

Defendant's post-Miranda statements are admissible pursuant to the
principles announced in Oregon v. Els tad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and State v.
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). Specifically, the Court has examined
whether a "a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process
that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period." Troyer, 910 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S.
at 309).

4.

In the instant case, although defendant's initial statement was made without
benefit of Miranda warnings, it was unaccompanied by actual coercion.
Therefore, the absence of Miranda prior to the initial statement does not
sufficiently taint the investigatory process so as to render ineffective the
subsequent waiver.

5.

The defendant made a voluntary and informed waiver of his Miranda rights
before making the second statement.

6.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is
granted with respect to his initial, pre-Miranda statement admitting
ownership of the black bag in question, and denied as to defendant's postMiranda statements reaffirming ownership and describing the contents of
the bag.

(R177-178),add.D. 4

4

In denying defendant's related motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the
close of the State's case at trial, the trial court reaffirmed its pretrial ruling denying
12

Defendant never moved to admit the preliminary hearing transcript, nor did he
designate and/or certify it as part of the record on appeal (R161-164), add. B. Without
the preliminary hearing transcript, this Court cannot review the trial court's conclusion
that police questioning was not coercive. Consequently, it must affirm.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the appellant to include
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant
claims is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence. "In essence, Rule 11 directs
counsel to provide this Court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal."
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah
1989). Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing
court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788
P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden,
761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (jury voir dire recorded but not
transcribed).
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials necessary to support an
appeal rests with the appellant. Linden, 761 P.2d at 1388; State v. Theison, 709 P.2d
307, 309 (Utah 1985). An appellate court will not "speculate on the existence of facts

defendant's motion to suppress his post-Miranda admission, observing in part that "it's
even clearer after hearing the evidence that there was an absence of coercion in his
statement" (see R191:267-269). Defendant has not challenged the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss on appeal.
13

that do not appear in the record." Id. "When crucial matters are not included in the
record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court." Id.
See also Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033
(1990); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771,
773 (Utah 1985); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Jones, 657
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). "Absent that recordfj defendant's assignment of error
stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court has power to determine. This
Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (quoting State
v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) (in turn quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657
P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983))). Moreover, "[njeither
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the
relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
Officers Dimond and Evans' trial testimony is before this Court, and it is this trial
testimony which defendant primarily in his Statement of the Facts and in the body of his
argument. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 8-11, 24-27. However, defendant did not renew his
motion to suppress after the officers testimony came in {see, e.g.9 R190:218-258, 266267). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the same evidence was adduced at trial as was
adduced at the preliminary hearing. This is why most appellate courts (Utah has no rule),
in reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, will consider only
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evidence before the court at the suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks,
978 F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App.
1992); State v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d
1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d 854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§11.1(c) (1987).
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236,
1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir.
1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d
686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal).
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will
not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled.
The State is aware of no jurisdiction following the rule that an appellate court may
reverse a pretrial ruling based only on evidence presented at trial without considering
evidence presented at the pretrial hearing.
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Consequently, in the absence of crucial portions of the record, this Court should
presume the correctness of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
A.

Clarification of Proceedings Below.

Pretrial Stipulation. Prior to the beginning of trial on 11 September 2000, the
parties stipulated on the record that Officers Dimond and Evans would not testify as to
the statements defendant made with respect to the origin of the car stereos found in
defendant's bag with the marijuana (R190:14-15, R190:230-231) (copies of the pertinent
transcript pages are contained in addendum E). Trial counsel stated the stipulation as
follows:
Your Honor, there is one matter that I think we need to put on the record
that [the prosecutor] and I have agreed to, but just so that the Court's aware
of it. As the Court is I'm sure aware from our Motion hearing, the bag in
question contained what appears to be marijuana and ultimately was tested
to be, as well as some other property which included car stereos and face
plates from stereos. It's my understanding that [the prosecutor] has
instructed her witnesses « . . . - not to mention specifically what they are. I
think what she's planning to do was simply ask them did [defendant]
explain the other property or, but not go into what the property is or not go
into what specifically what [defendant] said about the other property.
(R190:14-15),add.E.
Trial Testimony. Thereafter, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from
Officers Dimond and Evans without objection from trial counsel:
PROSECUTOR:

When you looked in this black bag, initially what was
the first thing you saw?
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OFFICER DIMOND:

There was, there was some car stereos inside the bag.
There was a baggie of marijuana.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay, when you looked into that bag what did you
observe?

OFFICER EVANS:

I observed a couple stereos, couple, some tools. I
observed a couple baggies with green leafy substance
inside.

(R190:133, 165), add. E.
Additionally, Officer Evans' responded to the prosecutor's question about the first
thing he did following defendant's arrest as follows:
OFFICER EVANS:

After he'd been placed? I just told him I wanted to ask
him a few questions and I asked him if he had ever
been read his Miranda rights. He said yes.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay.

OFFICER EVANS:

I said do you understand those? He said yes. Then I
went through and explained what his rights were and
asked if he would like to talk to me.

(R190:167-168),add.E.
Following Officer Evans, the State called two more witnesses before concluding
its case (R190:190, 203, 218).
Motion for Mistrial Based on Alleged Violation of Parties' Pretrial Stipulation.
Defendant first complained about a possible violation of the parties pretrial stipulation
during an in camera conference with the trial court, after the State had rested (Rl90:224),
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add. E. Specifically, trial counsel moved for a mistrial, indicating it was her
understanding that
the State's witnesses were not going to bring to the jury's attention the fact
that there were car stereos in the bag, State's Exhibit 1, and it's my
recollection that both Officer Dimond and Officer Evans did, in fact,
mention those. Although they did not specify anything about [defendant's]
statement in regard to those. I believe that's in violation of our stipulation
and, further the stipulation in my view at least was based on the fact that
that's an indication of some prior or other bad acts which I believe is
prohibited by Rule 404 and that was my reason for speaking with [the
prosecutor] about it.
{id).
Prosecutor's Response. The prosecutor responded that she understood the parties
pretrial stipulation to be that she
would not ask the officers, nor would they testify about the statements
[defendant] made with respect to the origin of the stuff in the bags,
specifically the car stereos were stolen, and I didn't ask them that and they
didn't testify to that. I don't believe it was ever a part of the stipulation that
we would ever hide what was in the bag or that we would not discuss the
other items that were in the bag besides the marijuana.
My, my understanding of the stipulation was that I would not ask the
officers and they would not testify as to [defendant's] statement that the
stereos had been stolen.
(R190:230),add.E.
Ruling. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor's recollection of the parties'
stipulation:
That was my understanding that there would be no lengthy discussion of the
stereos, that what would occur would be a brief description of what was
seen in the black bag, that there would be absolutely no inference or followup on the potential source of the stereos.
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So, I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial on that, and in closing,
the State may not allude to it. The defense, however, may allude to it. If
there's some way that you think it can help you and you can clean it up
because the best thing, the best possibility - and I remember this vividly the stipulation, I should have on my own motion probably ruled that the
stereo heads or whatever they were, were not even to be referenced has
having been in the bag. But that was not the stipulation as I recall it. There
was no reason for it to be discussed and consequently, it would have been
cleaner had it not been, but I see no violation in the stipulation
(R190:230-231), add. E. The prosecutor then sought clarification from the trial court
that she would be able to argue to the jury that defendant made comments to the officers
indicating he knew what was in the bag which "is evidence of the fact that the bag was
his" (Rl90:231-232), add. E. The trial court agreed so long as the prosecutor did not
allude to the stereos: "You may say that [defendant] made reference to what items were
in the bag, described a few of the different things and by his description it was clear that
he had seen the inner contents of the bag" (Rl 90:232), add. E.
Motion for Mistrial Based on Officer Evans's Reference to Possible Prior
Administration of Miranda Rights. At the same time defendant moved for a mistrial
based on the "stereo" evidence, he also moved for a mistrial based on Officer Evans'
reference to a possible prior administration of Miranda rights, to which defendant also
initially raised no objection (R190:224-225), add. E.
Ruling. The trial court remarked that she had not even heard Officer Evans'
testimony regarding the prior Miranda warning and noted if she had missed it, "perhaps
the jury did as well" (R190:225-226), add. E. The prosecutor agreed that Officer Evans
had so testified, but pointed out that defendant did not object, or move to strike (id.). The
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trial court agreed: "That's true. There was no motion to strike, no ability to clarify it
because of that-" (id.). Trial counsel said her non-objection was strategic: "I
intentionally did not object because if I objected, that's just going to bring it to the jury's
attention even more . . . I tactically decided to make a motion for mistrial based on the
testimony rather than take the chance of bringing - . . . - further attention to it" (id.). The
trial court indicated she understood the strategy, but also pointed out that
[t]he problem is that when you make that strategic determination and don't
raise the issue, and certainly you don't raise it in front of the jury anyway,
you say you need a brief recess and, in fact, we did take a recess around that
time. You call it to my attention and there a number of ways in which it can
be handled by my making some kind of curative statement. It is, however,
an incredibly stupid thing to have said and I missed it, which the only good
thing, because if I missed it, perhaps the jury did as well.
(Rl90:226), add. E.
The trial court then had trial counsel restate the complained of Miranda testimony
and trial counsel recalled that Officer Evans testified, "I asked [defendant] if he had been
Mirandized before and he said yes and I said to him then you understand what it means -"
(id.). The trial court responded,
Okay, I don't think then it's the problem that I initially saw it to be. I know
unfortunately what Officer Evans meant and you know what Officer Evans
meant. But the jury has no way of knowing what Officer Evans meant and
he could have meant were you Mirandized a few minutes ago. It does not
necessarily allude to or reference another time and another crime. He
doesn't say were you Mirandized on another case. Have you ever been
arrested before? Have you ever been charged with a crime before? He just
says have you been Mirandized before - . . . - which could have been
in the last 15 minutes.
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(R190:227), add. E. The trial court then offered to "make some kind of curative
statement if you'd like me to[,]" and further stated she was "inclined to deny to the
motion for a mistrial" (id.).
Trial counsel initially declined the offered curative statement: "Your Honor, it
would not be my request that the Court make any sort of curative statement. In my view,
if any or all of the jurors did not notice that statement, then that would simply bring it to
their attention and I'm, I'm concerned about that happening[.]" (id.). In response, the
trial court gave an example of what the proposed curative statement would entail:
What about if I were merely to say at an appropriate point in time,
incidentally we use a lot of words in court like preliminary hearings and
Miranda, words that we in the legal system know the meaning of and you
may not know the meaning of. Just so you understand Miranda are the
rights that are given by a law enforcement officer, typically on a card, and
they talk about you have the right to remain silent, etc., and it's frequently a
situation where one officer with another officer may do the Mirandizing
and the other officer may not and they'll check to see if one has, has given
the Miranda rights to the defendant. It being generic like that does not
misrepresent the facts. Because that is certainly something that happens
where on officer will ask if a suspect has been Mirandizedby his partner, or
the other officer there.
I don't know if that helps or hurts. But I offer it as a possible
solution and I can give it in the context that a broader description of some
legal terms so that it doesn't sound like we're just pulling out one concept
and one term and drawing attention to it and I'd be happy to do that
(Rl90:227-228), add. E. The trial court further emphasized that Officer Evans'
testimony had been "innocuous, did not imply a prior criminal record," and that she
would not
mis-try it and the main reason is that the manner in which it was stated does
not imply to the average person listening any prior problems with the law.
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It is neutral in that respect. It certainly could connote the other to a
sophisticated person in the legal environment and for that reason I wish the
statement had not been made. But I think to the average lay person it does
not have that connotation
(R190:234),add.E.
Following a recess and consultation with defendant, trial counsel urged the trial
court to give the suggested curative statement:
[W}e would like the Court to make a statement to the jurors such as you
suggested before about the reading of rights and indicating that sometimes
officers will check with a person and see if one of the officers have, have
read the rights or not to, to have that information before they do that, or,
you put it in a lot better that I did (R190:235), add. E. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
All right, you may all be seated. . . . In [sic] occurred to me while I
had you out there waiting and while counsel was visiting about a couple of
the legal points that there are a lot of terms that we use when we do a trial
and even though I'm sure all of you have degrees of college, we've got a
very bright jury here, even so and even given that on t.v. now you hear a lot
about the legal system. For some reason they find it more fascinating than
those of us involved in it do. But even so, there are a lot of terms that are
kind of alien or unknown to many lay people and I just wanted to allude to
that.
Chain is one of those term. Obviously, you know, if you have a
chain around your wrist that's different than what was being discussed in
here. Chain is a link from one person who has control of evidence to the
next person who has control, and that's a legal term that I just wanted to
make sure you understood.
We've talked about burden of proof and I'll talk about that more in
the instructions that I give you on the law, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is the standard in any criminal case, and I'll define that at
some length, because it's a concept that we grapple with and that is very
important. So these are terms that you hear and hopefully you won't find
them confusing.
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We also referenced Miranda and I think most of you have probably
heard about Miranda. It's been in effect now about 50 years actually. But
Miranda, just so you know, is something that occurs frequently in an
investigation when a police officer or police officers are talking to someone
and they want to get information and they want to put the person on notice,
as they should, that the person's statements may come back and may be
used in court and that they have the right to a lawyer, etc., etc.
Now in this case there was a reference to Miranda which was given
and one officer was not sure whether another officer had given it. The
Miranda rights, now you know what we were referring to if you didn't
before.
So as we go through the trial if I hear a term such as that, or it
appears that there's something like chain that may not be clear in the
manner of its usage, while it's an ordinary word, we may stop and just visit
about that briefly as we just did, and in the instructions that I give you on
the law there will be considerable help in terms of defining terms, the
burden of proof, etc.
One of the other things we tell you throughout the trial because it's
so important is the defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent
and these are important rights and the other concepts are very important and
so they're reduced to what we call legal instructions and I will read those
when the trial is over. There are about 30 of them, but they're short, they
don't take very long and they you'll take them with you into the jury room
and hopefully all the questions I haven't answered about terms and what not
will become clear as you look at those.
(R190:237-239),add.E.
After the jury had been excused for the day, the trial court observed to the parties:
I did not notice as I spoke that any of the jurors seemed to think that the
conversation was out of the ordinary. I don't think I highlighted any
particular aspect. At least I tried not to by beginning with a discussion of
chain and talking about burden of proof and Miranda. So I'm hopeful that
if the jury heard that it cleaned it up and they're well aware that when two
officers work together one may Mirandize a suspect and another not and
they're never clear.
(R190:242),add.E.
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B.

Defendant Fails to Show Any Error in the Trial Court's
Determination That the Officers' "Stereo" Testimony Did Not
Violate the Pretrial Stipulation; However, Even Assuming Error,
the Innocuous "Stereo" Testimony Did Not Prejudice Defendant

On appeal, defendant complains that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial
motion after finding that the officers' "stereo" testimony did not violate the parties
pretrial stipulation. Aplt. Br. at 28-37. However, defendant's bald appellate declaration
that the "stereo" testimony violated the stipulation does not make it so. Id. Indeed, trial
counsel's articulation of the parties' stipulation (see R190:14-15), add. E, is equally
susceptible to the prosecutor's and the trial court's interpretation, that the prosecutor
would not go into detail regarding the stereos and would not, in particular, elicit
testimony from the officers' regarding defendant's admission that he stole the stereos
found with the marijuana (see R190:230-231), add. E. The trial court's ruling should be
upheld on this ground.
Even if this Court determines the testimony did run afoul of the pretrial stipulation,
any error was harmless. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 69 (citing State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). First, the "stereo" testimony was buried in the middle of a
two-day proceeding and roughly 115 pages of witness testimony (see Rl 90:125-218;
R191:262-265,271-288). Second, defendant was not charged with an offense relating to
the stolen stereos and the jury was not told of defendant's admission that he stole the
stereos found with the marijuana (see Rl90:230-231), add. E. Third, the prosecutor did
not reference the stereos in her closing argument, but did properly emphasize that "when
given the opportunity to identify the owner of the bag, [defendant] identified himself
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{see R191:321). Thus, given the incriminating evidence that defendant claimed
ownership of the marijuana and admitted selling it because he could not find a job
(R190:168), add. E, any reasonable jury would have convicted him for the drug crime
with or without the innocuous references to the stereos also found in the black bag.
Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240.
C.

The Trial Court's Well-Crafted Statement Cured Any Possible
Negative Inference Jurors Might Have Drawn From Officer Evans'
Reference to a Prior Administration of Miranda Rights

As for defendant's remaining mistrial ground, i.e., Officer Evans's reference to a
possible prior administration of Miranda rights, the trial court's statement cured any
possible prejudice. The trial court offered to give the curative statement, even though the
trial court itself had not heard the obscure reference and doubted whether the jurors had
noted it {see R190:225-226, 242), add. E. Defendant initially resisted the trial court's
offer for fear it would draw the jury's attention to the matter; however, he ultimately
changed his mind and urged the trial court to give a curative statement:
[W]e would like the Court to make a statement to the jurors such as you
suggested before about the reading of rights and indicating that sometimes
officers will check with a person and see if one of the officers have, have
read the rights or not to, to have that information before they do that, or,
you put it in [sic] a lot better tha[n] I did.
(Rl90:235), add. E. Because the trial court's statement provided a reasonable alternative
explanation for the officer's question whether defendant had been previously given his
Miranda rights, the well-crafted statement cured any possible negative inference jurors
might have drawn from the testimony.
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This Court will "generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given
it." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).
Defendant does not claim, nor does the record indicate, that the possibility of any prior
Miranda warning was further referenced or emphasized at trial. Moreover, defendant
points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court's curative instruction was
ineffective. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998). In other words, even
assuming the jury heard Officer Evans's testimony arguably suggesting defendant had
been given Miranda warnings in a prior unrelated case, the testimony was not so
devastating or prejudicial as to vitiate the mitigating effect of the trial court's instruction
giving the jurors another explanation. Id. See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 50, 27 P.3d
1115 (holding trial court's curative instructions "were sufficient to dispel any prejudice
occasioned by the improper statement").
POINT HI
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE
HEARSAY EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE WITNESS HEARD
ANOTHER ESSENTIALLY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL CLAIM
THE BLACK BAG APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE-HALF
HOURS AFTER DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AND ARREST
In Point III of his brief, defendant claims the trial court erred in excluding as
unreliable hearsay, evidence that defendant's sole witness, Sonya Ortiz, heard another
individual claim ownership of the black bag approximately one and one/half hours after
defendant's admission and arrest. Aplt. Br. at 37-43 {see Rl 91:302) (copies of the
pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum F). Specifically, defendant claims
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Ortiz's testimony was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule
because the individual she overheard "made the admission while under the stress of
excitement caused by discovery that his bag of contraband was missing." Aplt. Br. at 37.
Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected.
Proceedings Below. Defense witness Ortiz was one of the people present at the
picnic table at the time of defendant's arrest (R191:271-304) (copies of the pertinent
transcript pages are contained in addendum F). According to Ortiz, another individual
known to her only as "Clay," was present when Officers Dimond and Evans initially
approached the picnic table, but immediately left the area (Rl91:276, 281, 288), add. F.
According to Ortiz, "Clay" returned about one and one/half hours after defendant's arrest
and was "angry,""yelling and swearing" (R191:282, 286-287), add. F. Upon objection
from the prosecutor, the trial court precluded Ortiz from testifying that "Clay" stated,
"The bag was mine. That stuff was mine" (R191:296), add. F.
The trial court rejected defendant's claim that the out-of-court declaration was
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (R191:283, 290-306),
add. F. In so ruling, the trial court found the alleged declaration was not precipitated by a
startling event, was not spontaneous (R191:301), add. F. The trial court further found
that the alleged declaration was not inherently reliable because so little was known about
"Clay" (R), add. F. (R191:301-305), add. F.
Analysis on Appeal. "The generally accepted rationale for the [excited utterance]
exception is that declarations made during a state of excitement temporarily still a
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startling event. Aplt. Br. at 37-41. Rather, defendant claims the trial court refused to
admit the out-of-court declaration because little more was known about "Clay" than his
first name, the lack of notice to the State. Id. Defendant thus claims that the trial court's
ruling is "fundamentally unsound because it is based upon factors that do not play a role
in evaluating the admissibility of excited utterance evidence." Aplt. Br. at 41.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court's observations as to the questionable
reliability of the purported out-of-court declaration are pertinent and relevant. Indeed,
"[t]he pivotal issue for an excited utterance is reliability." Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69. Here,
defendant did not attempt to hale "Clay" into court, and while his apparent unavailability
would not necessarily preclude admission of the out-of-court declaration, it did preclude
the trial court from evaluating "Clay's" age, and physical and mental ability. Smith, 909
P.2d at 239-240. Indeed, all that is known about "Clay" comes from Ortiz, and she
claimed only know his first name (Rl91:276, 281, 288), add. F. Defendant did not
testify or introduce other evidence corroborative of "Clay's" alleged out-of-court
declaration. As a result, the trial court was reasonably skeptical about "Clay's" existence,
let alone his level of knowledge and excitement when he allegedly claimed ownership of
the bag.
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(1996) (observing that it is not essential to know a declarant's identity, but trial courts
will be skeptical about the knowledge and excitement of an unidentified declarant).
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B.

Even Assuming "Clay" Exists, The Trial Court Properly Found
That no Startling Event Precipitated His Alleged Declaration,
and That "Clay's" Declaration Was Not Spontaneous.

Based on the above, the State remains skeptical that "Clay" even exists. However,
contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court considered more than the questionable
reliability of an out-of-court declaration by an essentially unknown individual, the trial
court also found that "Clay's" alleged declaration was neither precipitated by a startling
event, nor necessarily spontaneous (R191:301-305), add. F. These findings are wellsupported in the record and should be upheld.
To qualify as "startling" for purposes of the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule, an event must be so frightening or shocking as to "cause an excitement that
stills normal reflective thought processes." Smith, 909 P.2d at 239, 240 n.2 (term
"excitement" includes "any aroused emotional state that is likely to still reflective
capacity, such as fear and shock"). In other words, the requisite startling event must be
sufficient to produce "a high degree of emotional arousal." Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court properly recognized that the alleged "discovery" of the
missing bag was not the type of highly emotional event contemplated by the excited
utterance exception (Rl91:301-305), add. F. While defendant claims that courts have
recognized a wide range of events as sufficiently startling, the events defendant cites are
all arguably more exciting than the alleged "discover/' here. Indeed, they range the
gamut from "police entry into home with battering ram," an extremely exciting event, to
"bribe offer to juror," an arguably less exciting, yet illegal and thus arguably shocking
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event. Aplt. Br. at 41 n.39 (citing cases). Cf. West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App
188, 5 P.3d 1, If 13 (collecting cases with examples of statements blurted out in response
to startling events including, "You're a dead man," "Daddy shot Mommy. Mommy is
dead," "the son-of-bitch cut me").
Thus, even assuming arguendo "Clay" exists and that he made the out-of-court
declaration, the trial court reasonably questioned why "Clay" did not take the bag with
him when he walked away from the picnic table? (R191:306), add. F. The trial court's
observation leads to the reasonable inference that "Clay" left the area without the bag
when he saw the uniformed officers approach because he was concerned about his
proximity to, and possible association with the bag and its illegal contents. Assuming
"Clay" knew the bag held contraband, his departure further reasonably suggests he
anticipated the officers may be interested in the bag, and, if they discovered its illegal
content, may well seize it and arrest anyone associated with it. Given these unrebutted
and abundantly reasonable inferences, the bag's removal or disappearance could have
hardly surprised, let alone so shocked or frightened "Clay" as to still his reflective
processes when he returned to the scene one and one-half hours after abandoning the bag.
Smith, 909 P.2d at 238-240.
For the same reasons "Clay's" alleged "discovery" does not amount to a highly
emotional, shocking, frightening or otherwise startling event, the circumstances of this
case do not necessarily demonstrate that "Clay's" alleged declaration of ownership was
spontaneous. It is unknown where "Clay" went during the one and one-half hours
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following the officers' seizure of the bag and defendant's confession - - "Clay" may well
have observed these events and spent the time ruminating as to what he would say and
how he would act upon his return to the scene after police departed with defendant {see
R191:301-305),add.F.
In sum, the most that can be said in defendant's favor is that, assuming "Clay"
exists, his alleged declaration of ownership was related to the event at issue- -the police
seizure of the black bag. Utah R. Evid. 803(2). However, defendant failed to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that "Clay's" alleged out-of-court
declaration was also precipitated by a startling event and/or was spontaneous. Wetzel,
868 P.2d at 69. Under the circumstances of this case, the police seizure of the bag and
contraband therein was neither a frightening nor shocking event likely to highly arouse
"Clay's" emotional state and still his reflective processes. The trial court's well-reasoned
exclusion of this questionable hearsay evidence should thus be upheld.
C.

Any Arguable Error in Excluding "Clay's" Alleged Outof-Court Declaration Did Not Prejudice Defendant

Even assuming the trial court exceeded its discretion in excluding "Clay's"
questionable out-of-court declaration, any error was harmless. Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69
(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). Defendant's Mirandized
admission that the bag and its contents belonged to him is much weightier than the out-ofcourt declaration of an essentially unknown individual. The jury could reasonably have
determined that if "Clay" truly knew the contents of the bag and/or was otherwise
responsible for it, he would have taken it with him instead of risking its possible
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discovery by the approaching officers. Moreover, defendant's clear admission that the
bag belonged to him is otherwise unrebutted, i.e., defendant proffered no explanation as
to why he claimed the bag and the marijuana inside if it did not belong to him.5 Further,
at the time of his confession, defendant was no more associated with the bag and its
contents than any of the other five individuals sitting on the picnic table. See, e.g., State
v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) ("[T]here must be sufficient nexus between the
accused and drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and intent to
exercise dominion and control"). Moreover, defendant's claim on appeal that he was
worried about a drug dog sniffing drugs on him is undercut by the fact that no drugs were
ultimately found on his person (see, e.g., 191:319). Thus, even if "Clay's" questionable
out-of-court declaration had been admitted, there is no reasonable likelihood of a different
outcome, given the incriminating evidence that defendant claimed ownership of the
marijuana and admitted selling it because he could not find a job (R190:168), add. E.
Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240.

5

As set out in Point I of this brief, defendant's claim that his confession was
coerced by the officers discussion about bringing a drug dog to the scene is not
reviewable on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in a
public park should be affirmed.
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Page
4
14

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 1, 2000

2

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: Mr. Allred, if you'd sit with Ms. Remal.

4
5

Mr. Allred, I just gave your attorney and the State some good

6

news I think and that is that we had double set your case so

7

you were sure you got to go. We set it for the 5th of

8

September, which is Tuesday and we also set it for the 11th,

9

the following week, thinking that one way or another you would

10

be guaranteed a trial. Well, you can go either time because

11

the other trial set for the 5th has pled out. What's your

12

preference?

13

MS. REMAL: What she's saying is that we have a choice

14

between either of the dates and I've checked with everybody and

15

everybody's schedule is such that it doesn't really much

16

matter.

17

do it on Tuesday and the complication that I told the Judge

18

that I might possibly have, although probably won't, is that I

19

have another trial a lso set on the 11th,

Everybody can do it both days.

So we could certainly

20

THE COURT:

But that's not an in--custody case?

21

MS. REMAL:

It is an in-custody case. Although, I,

22

like I said I think it's probably going to resolve.

23

suppose

But I

-

24

THE COURT:

Is this an older case than that one?

25

MS. REMAL:

I don't think so.

I think that one .is
1

1 I slightly older.
2
3

They're both about the same time period,

THE COURT:

You're of the opinion the other one will

MS. REMAL:

Probably.

resolve?

4

Probably.

And again our pre-

5

trial conference isn't until Friday and so you never know for

6

sure until then.

But I think -

7

THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

8

MS. REMAL:

- that's the likelihood.

9

So, so Mr.

Allred says let's do it the 5th and that -

10

THE COURT:

That is your preference, Mr. Allred?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT: Okay, the 5th it is. We'll have the

Yes, ma'am.

13

defendant here at eight o'clock and we will ask that counsel be

14

here at 8:30.

15

All witnesses should be here by 8:30.

MS. REMAL: And Your Honor, I have discussed with Ms.

16

Ortez her schedule to find out if either of those dates matter

17

to her.

18

Ortiz until first thing after lunch.

19

with regard to the Court to ask her to be here, say, I don't

20

know, 1:15.

It's my best guess that probably we won't get to Ms.
So my intention would be

21

THE COURT: That's fine.

22

On the first day, Ms. Remal?

23

MS. REMAL: You know, I really think it's possible we

24
25

may complete the whole case in one day.

I don't think -

THE COURT: All right, well, that's always possible.

1 I It's pretty optimistic 2

MS. REMAL: I understand, but I -

3

THE COURT: - with a jury, but we'll do our best.

4 I I've done it before.
5

Now you have a witness, counsel.

Is your

witness available on the 5th?

6

MS. WISSLER: Yes.

7

THE COURT: All right.

I've taken an opportunity to

8

read these Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to

9

Suppress.

I've also taken an opportunity to read the Motion to

10

Suppress as well as the preliminary hearing transcript.

11

said that, I believe I'm prepared to listen to the testimony

12

and argument that you wish to make [inaudible] make.

13 I
14
15
16
17
18
19 J
20
21

MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor.

Having

I think it makes

sense to put the first thing to have Ms. Ortiz testify.
THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, do you want to come forward and
we'll swear you in.
MS. REMAL: She's just getting served with a subpoena
for Tuesday, so let me make sure that that's done.
THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Ortiz, now that you've got that,
can you come forward to be sworn?
SONYA ORTIZ,

22

having been first duly sworn, testified

23

upon his oath as follows:

24

THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, what you're going to find is

25

that the acoustics in here are not very good so I want you to

1

lean into the microphone and speak up as loudly as you can,

2

okay?

3

MS. ORTIZ: Okay.

4

MS. REMAL:

i

Your Honor, can I ask the Court's

5

permission to allow Mr. Allred to have one pen, a [inaudible]

6

so that he can take notes.

7

THE COURT: Yeah, certainly.

8

MS. REMAL: [inaudible] material, thank you.

9

DIRECT EXAMINATION

10
11
12

BY MS. REMAL:
Q

Sonya, would you state your full name and spell both

your first and your last name for us?

13

A

Okay, my name is Sonya Ortiz, S-O-N-Y-A O-R-T-I-Z.

14

Q

And Sonya, how old are you?

15

A

I'm 17.

16

Q

And where do you live?

17

A

On 1749 South 900 East.

18

Q

Okay, and is that in Salt Lake?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Okay.

Sonya, I want you to think back to June 9th of

21

this year and ask you if you remember being in Liberty Park on

22

that day?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And do you remember -

25

1

THE COURT: I'm sorry.
4

1

MS. REMAL: I'm sorry.

2

THE COURT: Repeat that please -

3

MS. REMAL: Sure -

4

THE COURT:

!

5

Q

- I was trying to do two things.

(BY MS. REMAL) I want you to think back to June 9th

6

of this year and ask you if you remember being in Liberty Park

7

on that day.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Do you remember about what time you got to Liberty

10

Park that day?

11

A

I'm not sure.

12

Q

Do you remember kind of the time of the day in terms

13

of was it morning, was it afternoon -

14

A

Late afternoon.

15

Q

Were you with anybody or with you, were you by

16

yourself?

17

A

I was with two of my friends.

18

Q

What are their names?

19

A

Krystal and Megan.

20

Q

And did all three of you go together to the park?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

While you were there with your two friends, what

23

generally were you doing?

24

A

Just walking around.

25

Q

And at some point did you meet up with some guys
5

1

there?

2

A

Yeah.

3

Q

What part of the park were you in when that happened? [

j
!

4

A

By the basketball courts.

5

Q

And how many guys were there that you met up with,

6 | with your friends?
7

A

There's at least five, maybe more.

8

Q

And I'll ask you to look around the courtroom here

9

today.

10

Do you recognize anybody in the courtroom as being one

of those people you met up with that day?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Can you point to that person and describe what that

13
14

person's wearing?
A

15
16
17
18

The yellow jumpsuit.
THE COURT: Okay, for the record, yeah, she's

identified the Defendant.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL) Had you known this young man before

that day?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Have you had any contact with him since that day?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Do you remember what his name is?

23

A

Tracy.

24

Q

And when you met up with these guys with, with your

25

friends, what did all of you do?

I

1 I

A

Just sit around and talk.

2

Q

At some point was there some contact you had with

3

some police officers?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And how long had you been talking with these guys

6

before the police officers came up to you?

7

A

Oh, 15, 20 minutes.

8

Q

And were you near anything in particular when the,

9

when the police officers came?

10

A

Hram.

11

Q

Were you sitting on anything, or by -

12

A

A table.

13

Q

What kind of a table?

14

A

Like a picnic table.

15

Q

Were there benches or chairs of some sort by the

16

table?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And describe to me what you remember about the police

19
20

coming up to you.
A

They had approached us and told us that they were,

21

that they had a phone call and, and the phone call had told

22

them that there was a drug deal that was going on.

23

Q

How many police officers were there?

24

A

Two.

25

Q

And were they in uniform or not in uniform?

1 I

A

They were in uniform.

2

Q

Did you see whether they got out of a car of any

3

sort, or vehicle of any kind?

4

A

A cop car.

5

Q

And was it a marked police car or a plain car?

6

A

A marked.

7

Q

And when the police officers came up to you, did one

8

do all the talking or did they both talk to you at -

9

A

They both did.

10

Q

Ifd ask you to look around the courtroom here today

11

and see if you see either of those police officers here?

12

A

Right there.

13

Q

And can you -

14
15

THE COURT: I didn't hear that. What Q

16
17

THE COURT: And did you say anything before?
A

18
19

24
25

And she had pointed to the

gentlemen seated with Ms. Wissler.
MS. REMAL: And, Your Honor, I believe that that's
Officer Evans for the record.

22
23

(BY MS. ORTIZ) I just said right there.
THE COURT: Okay.

20
21

(BY MS. REMAL) Can you point to that person?

THE COURT: All right, thank you.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL) Did you ever notice if there was any,

any bags or packages or anything there near where you were?
A

There was a bag laying on, on the side of the table.

1 j

Q

Can you remember what it looked like?

2

A

It was just a black bag.

3

Q

About how big was it would you say?

4

A

Probably like that big.

5

Q

So you're showing us with your hands, maybe about two

6

I'm not -

and a half feet long?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Something like that?

10 I

A

Probably like that wide.

11

Q

So maybe about six to nine inches wide, something

12

like that?

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

Did you notice if it had any handles or anything?

15

A

May have had a strap.

16

Q

Did you ever notice anybody, any of the guys or, or

9

17

And how wide do you think it

was?
I'm not sure.

you, your friends touching it or doing anything with the bag?

18

A

No.

19 I

Q

Did you learn the names of the other guys who you met

20

there that day besides Tracy, can you remember?

21

A

Two or three I think.

22

Q

What do you remember their names?

23

A

Abdul was one.

24
25

Quade, I can't remember any other

ones.
Q

Now when the police officers got over to where you

1

were, were all of these same people here, you and your friends

2 J and the, at least five guys?
3 I
4
5
6

A

No.

There was like some of them left, like two or

three or four of them left.
Q

Can you remember whether Tracy was one of the ones

that left or was Tracy one of the ones that was still there?

7

A

No, he stayed.

8

Q

Can you remember the names of the people who left?

9

A

One of the ones that left was the one Quade.

10

Q

Do you remember when they left?

Was it before the

11

police officers came over or as the police officer came over or

12

after the police officer -

13

A

It was as the police officers approached us.

14

Q

And you indicated that when the police officers came

15

over they said something about getting a phone call.

16

happened after that?

What

17

A

A phone call?

18

Q

Didn't, you indicated a minute ago that the police

19

officer said they got a phone call about some drug deal.

20

A

Oh, yeah.

21

Q

What happened after that?

22

A

They asked if we had seen any drugs or anything of

23

that sort.

24

Q

And, and were you all together when that was being

25 J asked of you?
10

1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

And what did everybody say?

3 I

A

"We haven't seen anything like that."

4 j

Q

And then what happened after that?

5

A

They saw the bag and they picked it up and asked who

6

it belonged to.

7

Q

And did, did anybody answer to that question?

8

A

No.

9

Q

What happened?

11

A

We told them that we didn't know whose it was.

12

Q

And so then what happened?

13

A

I think they searched the bag.

14

Q

And could you tell what was in the bag after they

15

searched it?

10

Did everyone just sit there, or, or

what?

16 j

A

They took everything out.

17

Q

Where did they put it?

18

A

On the table.

19

Q

And so were you able to see the items they took out

20

of the bag?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

What do you remember seeing was inside the bag?

23

A

Car stereos, screwdrivers, a bag of marijuana.

24

Q

And after they took the stuff out of the bag, what

25

happened after that?
11

1
2

A

They put it back in and asked us again if it had

belonged to any of us.

3

Q

And what was, what was the answers that were given?

4

A

We still denied it belonging to us.

5

Q

Did any of the police officers ever talk to you or

6

any of the other young people there separately instead of in a

7

group?

8

A

Yeah, they questioned us individually.

9

Q

Describe how that happened.

10

A

They, they asked us who does that belong to again,

11

and then they said that they'd like to question us individually

12

and see -

13
14

Q

And so did they ask you one by one to go someplace

else?

15

A

Yeah.

16

Q

Where did you go?

17

A

By a tree that was a couple feet away.

18

Q

And -

19

THE COURT: That was what?

20

THE WITNESS:

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22
23

Q

That was a couple feet away.

(BY MS. REMAL) And did you notice whether the police

officers talked to each one of you young people separately?

24

A

Yes.

25 J

Q

And were both police officers doing that, or was one
12

1 i police officer doing it?

•

I
2

!
A

Just one, and then the other one stayed with the

|
i

3

group.

4

Q

5

I
Was there ever a time that you tried to, to leave the

location of the picnic table and go someplace else?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

What was, what happened then?

8

A

We asked if we can use the restroom.

9

Q

And who do you mean by we asked?

10

A

Me and my two friends.

11

Q

Your two girlfriends?

12

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

13

Q

And do you remember whether the police officers

14

responded to that?

15

A

16

the bottom.

17

Q

18

They told us that we couldn't leave until they got to

Do you remember which police officer said that, or

was it both of them, or don't you remember?

19

A

It was both of them.

20

Q

Was there ever anything said about a police dog

21

coming?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

When did, when was there some discussion about that?

24

A

After they had spoken to us all individually and

25

still no one admitted the bags to belonging to us, they said
13

1

that they were going to bring in a dog and if any of us had any

2

involvement with the bag that the dogs would be able to sense

3

it.

4 J
5

MS. REMAL: I believe that's all the questions I have.
Ms. Wissler might have some questions for you.

6

THE WITNESS:

7

MS. WISSLER: I just have a couple of questions.

8
9
10
11

Okay.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MS. WISSLER:
Q

You indicated that the officers took each one of you

aside and asked you some questions about this bag -

12

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

13

Q

Is that right?

14

A

That's right.

15

Q

Did they put you in handcuffs when they did that?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Did they ever put you in handcuffs?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Okay.

20

Did they take Tracy aside the same way they

took the rest of you aside?

21

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

22

Q

And you watched them do that?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Okay.

25 J

A

I think they brought it in the other car.

Did you ever see a dog that day?

14

1 I

Q

Do you recall when you saw the dog, physically?

2

A

After they had handcuffed Tracy.

3

MS. WISSLER:

4 I

THE COURT: May I ask a couple of follow-up?

5

MS. REMAL:

Surely.

6

THE COURT:

Did they ever take the dog out of the

7

Okay, thanks, that's all I have.

car?

8

THE WITNESS: Yes.

9

THE COURT: And what did they do with the dog?

10
11
12
13

THE WITNESS:

They just took the dog around the area

of the basketball court and just let him sniff around.
THE COURT: Were you present when anyone admitted that
the black bag was theirs?

14

THE WITNESS: No.

15

THE COURT:

16

Any follow-up from either side?

Okay, thank you.

I have nothing further.

17

MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor.

18

MS. REMAL: No, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Ortiz, thank you for your

20

assistance.

You may stand down and we'll see you on Tuesday.

21

MS. ORTIZ: Okay.

22

MS. REMAL:

23

Now you say you [inaudible] come back to this same

24

Thank you, Your Honor.

courtroom, but instead of coming in to the courtroom, just wait

25 J outside in the hall, okay, and then when we're ready for you
i

i

15 !

1

we'11 come out and get you and bring you in, okay?

'

2

MS. ORTIZ:

[inaudible].

j

3 I

MS. REMAL: And don't talk about the case with anybody!

4 | [inaudible] there may be other witnesses standing outside,
5
6

[

sitting THE COURT: Yeah, Ms. Ortiz, that's extremely

7

important and I'm glad Ms. Remal brought it up.

One of the

8

rules in criminal cases is that we have an exclusionary rule,

9

which means that no one who's a witness has the right to talk

10

about the case with anyone else who's a witness, and the reason

11

for that is so that your memory remains your memory and someone

12

else's memory remains their's. You know how if you talk with a

13

group of people after a while you can't remember who said what?

14

Well what we like to do in a court of law is make sure that

15 I people only speak of what they remember.

So you should not

16 I discuss this with the defendant, not with any other witnesses,
17

including your girlfriends.

The only one you would, ones you

18

would want to discuss it with are the two attorney's, okay?

19 I

MS. ORTIZ: Okay.

20

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

21

MS. REMAL: You might want to bring like a magazine or

22

a book or something [inaudible] time. Even though we estimate

23

[inaudible] okay?

24

THE COURT: All right, any other witnesses Ms. Remal?

25 I

MS. REMAL: No, Your Honor.

I do have, if the Court
16

1

will allow, a correction on one of the pages of the preliminary

2

hearing transcript.

3

night that one of the questions I'd asked, [inaudible] -

4

THE COURT: And what page are we on?

5

MS. REMAL:

6

I noticed when I was looking at it last

Page 26, appeared to be incomplete and

although I certainly sometimes ask incomplete questions -

7

THE COURT: Rarely.

8

MS. REMAL: Right here, I've highlighted it for you so

9

that -

10

THE COURT:

Let's see, and that conversation between

11

Mr. Allred and Officer Dimond about the dog, oh, occurred after

12

the conversation between you and Officer Dimond about the dogs,

13

do you accept that correction?

14
15

MS. WISSLER: I do, Your Honor.
the tape but I certainly -

16
17

MS. REMAL: And I have the tape here for you if you'd
like to see that.

18
19

MS. WISSLER:

That's fine, [inaudible], not a

problem.

20

THE COURT:

21

going to be any more witnesses?

22
23

I haven't reviewed

Let me change it on mine. Are there

MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor, we submit it on the
(inaudible).

24

THE COURT: Would you like to make argument?

25

MS. REMAL: I would, Your Honor, [inaudible] —
17

1

THE COURT: All right.

2

MS. REMAL: - would like to wait until I'm done to

3 J respond.
4 J

THE COURT: One thing, so that I don't forget and I do

5

want to hear from both of you if you wish to address this and

6

I'll give you back your copy since I've corrected mine.

7

appreciate that.

8

dire.

9
10
11
12
13
14

I

j

I don't have any jury instructions or voir

Do you all happen to have them with you?
MS. REMAL: No.
THE COURT:

Ladies, ladies, ladies, when can I expect

these from you?
MS. REMAL:

Depends on how quickly we're done here.

I can probably have them to you by five.
THE COURT:

Well I'll, I'll do this.

I want them by

15

eight o'clock on Tuesday and if you will do that for me, I

16

won't make you do it tonight.

17

I can look them over and see what I will and will not allow and

18

then I'm going to allow you both to do some of your own voir

19

dire. What I will do is ask the stock and then let you have

20

liberty to follow-up on any of the stocks and ask any of your

21

own questions.

22

But I want them at eight so that

I also want to know who the witnesses are going to be

23

since we don't have witness lists or exhibit lists.

24

you if we could, Ms. Wissler.

25

MS. WISSLER:

Start with

Your Honor, I anticipate calling the
18

1 I officers involved.
2

THE COURT: Give me their names.

3

MS. WISSLER: Officer Dimond and Officer Evans, he's

4

here today.

I understand we do not have a stipulation as

5

to the chain of custody so I need to call the chain of custody

6

witnesses.

7

THE COURT: And who are they?

8

MS. WISSLER:

9

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

10

MS. WISSLER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. WISSLER:

13

That would be I believe Amy Despain -

Bill Neves, and [inaudible] -

Wait, one more time, Bill?
I'm sorry, Bill Neves, N-E-V-E-S, and

Ted [inaudible] from the crime lab and toxicologist.

14

THE COURT: And who's the toxicologist?

15

MS. WISSLER:

16

THE COURT: Who?

17

MS. WISSLER:

18

THE COURT:

19 I

MS. WISSLER:

20

Barbara Hopkins.

Barbara Hopkins.
Okay, anyone else?
No, Your Honor, that's all I anticipate

calling.

21

THE COURT:

Okay, and Ms. Remal?

22

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I anticipate that we'll be

23

calling Ms. Ortiz and we may or may not call Mr. Allred.

24

decide that as we progress.

25 J

THE COURT:

We'll

Okay, and those are the only two
19

1

potential witnesses?

2

MS. REMAL:

I probably should list Dennis Couch. I

3

don't anticipate calling him, but in the event that there's

4

some last minute thing that I ask him to do and come and

5

testify about.

6
7

THE COURT:

All right, now what about

exhibits?

8
9

Okay.

MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I only anticipate two
exhibits, that being the black bag that we discussed and the

10

contents, being the marijuana.

11

stereos.

12

I'm not interested in the car

THE COURT: All right, so you're going to present I

13

assume as initially one exhibit, marked one, and then when you

14

remove any pieces or parts from it, you would have them

15

separately marked.

16

MS. WISSLER:

17

THE COURT: And then what about the tox report?

18

MS. WISSLER:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Right.

That also.
Okay. All right.

That's helpful, and

now I'm happy to hear your arguments.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, as I didn't have the

22

preliminary hearing transcript yet at the time of the motion,

23

if you think it would be helpful to Your Honor I've pinpointed

24

pages and lines in the preliminary hearing transcript that I

25 I think that are significant.
20

1

THE COURT:

That's helpful.

2

MS. REMAL:

And, and let me go through those.

3

It's

clear that Officer Evans and Officer Dimond approached the

4 J young people who were sitting at the picnic table in Liberty
5

Park and we know that from the preliminary hearing Pages 2 and

6

3.

We know that later on a third officer, Officer Serrio I

7 I believe is his name, came with a dog and that was way towards
8

the end of the, the entire incident, preliminary hearing Page

9

11. The officers were in uniform, including guns, not drawn,

10

but guns that are part of their uniform and were in marked
I

11

police vehicles, that's at the preliminary hearing Page 12.

j

!
i
I

The officers questioned the young people there at the \

12

i

13

picnic table about whether there was any drug activity, either |

14

seen by them or that they participated in.

15

neither seen any or participated any, in any, that's

They said that they'

16 I preliminary hearing Page 4.
17 j
18
19

I

Mr. Allred was frisked for weapons, that's at
preliminary hearing Page 18. The young people were run for

|

warrants.

[

That took five to ten minutes.

That's at

i
i

!

20

preliminary hearing Page 19. A bag was noticed near the table, ]

21

sort of on the ground by the picnic table.

That's at

'

I
22
23

preliminary hearing Page 5. The officers questioned the young |
people about whether the bag was theirs. They all said no.
j
i
t

24
25 j

That's at preliminary hearing Page 6.
The officers looked inside the bag and saw items,

I
|
21

1

including the green leafy substance, which ultimately was

2 I determined to be marijuana.
3

That's at preliminary hearing Page

6.

4

The officers pulled each of the six aside by Officer

5

Evans' prelim testimony, 10 to 15 feet from the others, to

6

question them individually about the bag and ownership of the

7

bag.

8
9
10

That's at preliminary hearing Page 21.
Each of the young people were questioned individually

about the ownership of the bag.

That's also preliminary

hearing Page 21.

11

Officer Evans testified at the preliminary hearing

12

that in his view each of the young people were free to leave.

13

That's at preliminary hearing Page 21 and onto Page 22.

14

There was a discussion between Officer Evans and

15

Officer Dimond regarding bringing a drug sniffing dog to the,

16

the scene there, to come down and sniff out who the bag

17

belonged to.

18

That's at preliminary hearing Page 24 and 25.

One of the officers mentioned that they have canine,

19

canine dogs which are mean.

20

25.

21

That's at preliminary hearing Page

Officer Evans indicated to Officer Dimond in front of

22

the six young people that there was a dog that was used in the

23

County who had bitten someone's back side.

24

preliminary hearing Page 25.

25

That was at

That it was after the discussion about the dogs that
22

1 I Mr* Allred for the first time admitted to Officer Dimond that
2

the bag was his and there may have been more discussion,

3

according to Officer Evans, about the dogs after that statement

4 I was made.

That's at preliminary hearing Page 25 and on to Page

5

26, and Officer Evans himself Mirandized Mr. Allred after Mr.

6

Allred had already made the statement to Officer Dimond about

7

the bag being his and that's at preliminary hearing Page 28.

8

Your Honor, my Motion itself was perhaps not as clear

9 I as it ought to have been and so I'm hoping I can make that
10

clearer today. There are actually two separate statements made

11

by Mr. Allred to the police officers as I understand it. One

12

was made to Officer Dimond, that's the first statement that was

13

made and then there was a second statement that was made by Mr".

14

Allred to Officer Evans.

15

hearing indicates that, as far as I can tell, the statement to

The testimony at the preliminary

16 I Officer Dimond was done without benefit of a Miranda warning
17 I being given, but certainly the statement made subsequent to
18
19 I

that by Officer Evans was after Miranda warnings were given.
In my view, Your Honor, the first statement by Mr.

20

Allred, and that's the one to Officer Dimond, ought to be

21

suppressed because in my view it was a custodial interrogation

22

and there was no Miranda given.

23
24
25

THE COURT: What exactly was said at that time, just
that the bag was his?
MS. REMAL:

The bag was his, yes, that's my
23

1

understanding, Your Honor.

2
3

THE COURT: All right, now how do you, what is your
perception as to how you establish that he's in custody?

4

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, -

5

THE COURT:

He was not totally under arrest, as I

6

understand it and he's not in cuffs.

7

MS. REMAL:

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. REMAL:

- those two things are, are correct.

10

THE COURT:

- my understanding is they were free to

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, as the, the, both the State's

11
12

That's correct, Your Honor.
And -

leave.

13

Memo and my motion indicate, State, Salt Lake City

14

has indicated that there are four factors the Court should look

15

at in determining that.

16

the investigation is focused on a particular person, whether

17

the objective indicia of arrest are present and the length and

18

form of the interrogation.

19

v.

earner

The site of the interrogation, whether

Certainly the site of the interrogation being at the

20

park is not something that indicates necessarily that Mr.

21

Allred was in custody/ as it would for instance if it were in a

22

jail or, or police department.

23

investigation focused on Mr. Allred, it appears to me that it

24

focused on each of them at the time that they were questioned

Whether or not the

25 J individually, and although that focus shifted from person to
24

1 I person, certainly at the time that Mr. Allred was being
2
3

individually questioned it was focused on him.
The length and form of interrogation, in my view,

4 ' Your Honor, it's certainly not an extremely rapid situation,
5

because we know that from start to finish there was time enough

6

for them to be frisked, for there to be a discussion about

7

whether or not there was drug activity observed or participated

8

in, there was a warrants check that took five to ten minutes,

9 I there was then the questioning of the individuals in the group
10

about the bag and the contents, then there was the individual

11

questioning of all of them.

12

THE COURT:

Did anyone ever suggest though with

13

specificity how long it took?

14 I

MS. REMAL:

Not to my recollection, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

16 J

MS. REMAL:

The only time frame that I recall is that

17 I Officer Evans testifying that the warrants check itself he
18
19 J

believes took between five and ten minutes.
The form of the interrogation, Your Honor, in my

20

view, took two forms.

It was both direct questioning and was

21

what I believe is the functional equivalent of questioning.

22

Certainly there was the direct questioning, "Is this bag yours,

23 I who's bag is this, who's stuff is this in the bag," and in my
24

view, Your Honor, the discussion by the two officers in front

25

of the individuals about the dog, about there being a mean dog,
25

1 I about did you remember about that dog who bit somebody, is the
2

functional equivalent of questioning in combination with a

3 I suggestion to the individuals that if somebody doesn't own up
4 j to the bag, they're going to bring the dog, some of the dogs
5

are mean and we know that dogs sometimes bite people and so in

6

my view -

7

THE COURT:

So you're saying that's coercion?

8

MS. REMAL:

I'm saying that that's coercive, Your

9
10

Honor.
In regards to the objective indicia of arrest

11

present, certainly it's true handcuffs were not used.

12

true that, that as far as I know the words you're under arrest

13

were not, were not spoken during the time of the questioning.

14

But in my view, Your Honor, there are other indicia of arrest

15

or custody.

16

marked police vehicle and had guns as part of the uniform,

17

although there's no suggestion that they were drawn or pointed,

18

The officers were in uniform.

THE COURT:

It's

They were in a

I think there was a comment, you correct

19

if I'm wrong, in the preliminary hearing transcript that the

20

officers or one of the officers had essentially made a

21

determination that this was not a problematic scenario, that

22

there were no drugs, was ready to let them all go when the

23 I black bag was spotted.
24
25

MS. REMAL:

That, I believe you're accurate about

that being the testimony.
26

1 I
2

THE COURT:

So what do you, at a certain point in

time when the questioning began, there was a free [inaudible] -

3

MS. REMAL:

Well, Your Honor, I, this is -

4

THE COURT: Arguably.

5

MS. REMAL: - why I wanted the Court to hear Ms.

6

Ortiz' testimony.

So that you could hear her testimony about

7

the fact that she and her girlfriends asked to use the restroom

8

and, and were told by the officers they were not allowed to

9

leave and go to the restroom until they got to the bottom of

10

this and so I believe that that's an important indicia that in

11

fact the young people were not free to leave because they

12

specifically asked and were denied permission to do that.

13

Your Honor, I think other indicia of, another indicia

14

of arrest or custody is the separation of each of the young

15

people from the others to be questioned individually and the

16

fact that that separation occurred by moving them physically

17

from the location of the picnic table where the other kids were

18

over to someplace else could be questioned by an officer out of

19

the hearing on the others.

20

put all those indicia together, it does indicate custodial

21

situation.

22

So in my view, Your Honor, when you

Your Honor, in regards to the statement to Officer

23

Evans, clearly that was an in-custody statement. At that time

24

Mr. Allred was handcuffed and sitting on the picnic table

25 J according to Officer Evans' testimony.

So I don't think that's
27

1

a question.

Certainly there was Miranda given at that time.

2 I Officer Evans testified at the preliminary hearing that he did
3

so prior to questioning Mr. Allred, but that that questioning

4 I took place right after Mr. Allred had made his statement to
5

Officer Dimond and admitted the bag was his.

6

In my view, Your Honor, that then puts us in a

7

situation where the Court has to make a determination, well,

8

first the Court has to make a determination if it's problematic

9

that Miranda was not given during the questioning by Officer

10
11
12

Dimond.
THE COURT:

Which, of course, turns on whether or not

there was a custodial situation.

13

MS. REMAL:

Correct, correct.

14

THE COURT: And I can't see, although I understand

15

your point about the young woman and the restroom, I can't see

16

that it was custodial.

17

appears to have concluded or the testimony se€»ms to have

18

indicated that the officers were leaning toward releasing the

19

whole group of people at the point in time just before the

20

defendant acknowledged that the bag was his.

21

because as you say the young woman asked to use the restroom

22

and they said not til we get to the bottom of this.

23

doesn't mean she can't leave. What it means is that they're

24

trying to control a group of people and keep them perhaps from

In fact, to me the preliminary hearing

It's a tough one,

That to me

25 J talking to one another and don't want them sort of out of their
28

1 j sight.
2

But it isn't the same as putting them in custody and

forbidding them to leave the vicinity.

So I can't really find,

3 I unless there's more that I've missed, that the first statement
4 j was custodial.

Obviously, one would have liked there to have

5

been a Miranda warning given immediately and for the young

6

woman to have been taken to the restroom if they were worried

7

about conversation, were allowed to.go to the restroom.

8

concern about that is not that great.

9
10
11

;

But my

Let me ask you this, what was said after Miranda to
Detective Evans?
MS. REMAL:

Let me point you to the part of the

12

transcript that, what was said to my recollection, Your Honor,

13

is that Mr. Allred stated that the bag was his and that he had

14

been selling marijuana in the park for the last couple of

15

months because he'd been unable to find employment.

16

Honor, on Page 27 of the preliminary hearing transcript, Ms.

17

Wissler was asking Officer Evans about that conversation and

18

Officer Evans indicated that he had, Mr. Allred had admitted

19

the bag was his, that he admitted that it was marijuana, that

20

the green leafy substance was marijuana and that he'd been

21

selling marijuana because he was unable to get a job.

22
23

Your

THE COURT: All right, so what is your position
concerning, what if I keep out the first statement, the no bag,

24 I or the bag is mine and don't allow any reference to that first
25

reference to the bag?

He wasn't mirandized.

One could argue
29

1

that he was in custody and only allow in what comes after

2

Miranda.

3

MS. REMAL: And, Your Honor, my argument about, about

4

that second statement by Mr. Allred to Officer Evans after

5

Miranda is that, that the Court is then in a position where you

6

have to make a determination whether or not the second

7

statement was an exploitation of the prior improper statement

8

because it wasn't mirandized and I think that there are cases

9

such as State

versus

Arroyo

and State versus

Allen,

which talk

10

about if there's a prior police misconduct or illegality and

11

then something else that happens afterwards the Court has to

12

make a decision about whether there's enough attenuation to

13

essentially purge the taint of that initial -

14
15

THE COURT:

We've got two different officers

involved.

16

MS. REMAL: Right.

17

THE COURT:

We don't have the same officer.

We don't

18

have the officer, as I recall and I could be wrong, saying I

19

understand you just said the bag was yours.

20

starts a fresh, as I recall. And you're in a park, which never

21

changes. You're not taken to police headquarters.

22

even put in a patrol car.

23

long this took, it doesn't appear to have been inordinately

24

long from what Ms. Ortiz said or from the preliminary hearing

25

transcript.

It sort of

You're not

While it's not clear exactly how

The focus was not on the defendant until he had
30

1 j acknowledged the bag was his.
2

There are, as far as I can tell, no indicia of arrest

3 | except certainly the defendant was under arrest when he was
4 j told he's under arrest and the cuffs were put on.

Before that

5 j the only thing you've got is Ms. Ortiz' limitation on using the,
6 I restroom, and I guess my question on that would be Liberty

;

7 I Park's pretty big and there are a lot of different restrooms

j

I

i

8

and I'd be interested in where the restroom was in relation to

9

where she was.

!
i
i

10 j

I'll tell you what troubles me, frankly, is this

I think this is coercive, or potentially1

11

reference to the dog.

12

coercive and I don't like it at all, and was that after the

13

Miranda?

14
15

MS. REMAL:

j

(

The, the discussion about the dogs was,

as I understand it, prior to both statements Mr. Allred made.

16 I Prior to the statement to Officer Dimond and, and also prior to
17

the statement to Officer Evans.

18

discussion both before and after the statements, but certainly

19

some of it was before.

20

There appears that there was

THE COURT: And I wouldn't have any problem with an

21 I officer saying, you know, we have dogs that can sniff out
22

marijuana.

23

them out.

If there's more marijuana around here we may bring
But to suggest that the dog can bite someone and do

24 J damage and harm someone is frankly problematic.
25

I think it's

poor police work.
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1

MS- REMAL:

And, Your Honor, that -

2

THE COURT:

Potentially coercive.

3

MS. REMAL:

That, that's the basis of my argument,

4

which is really separate from the Miranda that Mr. Allred's

5

statement was not voluntarily given, but rather given as a

6

product of the fact that he'd been told about, they'd all been

7

told about these dogs potentially being brought or a dog

8

potentially being brought, that at least some of the dogs that

9

are police dogs are mean and there's been an instance at least

10

once where someone's been bitten during the process of sniffing

11

them out. And in my view that's the very kind of coercion that

12

makes a statement involuntary.

13

And just so the record is clear, and I understand

14

what the Court's feeling is about the statement that Mr. Allred

15

gave to Officer Dimond, but just for the record, my argument

16

about Officer Evans' Mirandized statement is that it's, it's

17

not attenuated enough from the initial Officer Dimond statement

18

and therefore it can't be used either.

19

THE COURT:

[inaudible]

20

MS. REMAL:

Just [inaudible] -

21

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, is there a discussion

22

between Officer Allred [sic] and Officer Dimond about the first

23

statement before the second statement is made after Miranda?

24

MS. REMAL:

It was my understanding from the

25 I preliminary-hearing that although Officer Evans wasn't part of
32

1 i that conversation and didn't overhear it that he understood
2

that a confession had been made and that's why they had

3

arrested Mr. Allred, that Mr. Allred was already under arrest

4 I at the time that Officer Evans spoke to him.
5

THE COURT:

Okay, did you wish to say anything else?

6

MS. REMAL:

No, Your Honor, I think, I think the

7

Court understands my argument.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

Counsel?

10

MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I'll be brief.

11

whether Your Honor received a copy of the memorandum I filed

12

[inaudible] I have -

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. WISSLER:

15

I don't know

No, but I - [inaudible] this morning and I

apologize for the lateness.

16 I

THE COURT:

Yes, I did get that, I've read that.

17 j

MS. WISSLER: So I won't recite what's written in the

18

memorandum.

But what I would like to say about the coercion

19

aspect that's been alleged in this case is two things, and

20

that's first of all, and I think most importantly is there was

21

no dog present at the scene of this incident until after Mr.

22

Allred was in handcuffs and was safely in a patrol car. The

23

dog was not removed from the car until that time and that's by

24

the testimony of the witness that testified here as well today.

25

It isn't as if this dog was pulling on the end of the rope,
33

1 I gnashing his teeth and barking at the time that Mr. Allred made
2

his confession.

3 J

THE COURT:

4

MS. WISSLER:

5

That's true.
And I would further indicate to the

Court -

6

THE COURT:

That's true.

7

MS. WISSLER:

- that upon questioning today, Ms.

8

Ortiz indicated that she recalled the officer saying that if

9

they had any involvement in this marijuana the dog would be

10

able to sniff it out.

She made no reference today to any

11

comment about the dog biting anyone and what's important about

12

that, Your Honor, is certainly not to suggest that that comment

13

didn't occur, but rather to suggest that it apparently didn't

14

have much of an impact on Ms. Ortiz because she didn't even

15

testify about it here in Court today.

16

today was that they told her that they were, that they could

17

bring in the dog and that if any of these individuals had any

18

association with this bag the dog would be able to sense it.

What she said in Court

19

THE COURT:

Well they went -

20

MS. WISSLER:

21

THE COURT: - farther than that according to the

She made no comment about it at all.

22

preliminary hearing transcript.

23

MS. WISSLER:

24

And I agree with the Court. What I,

what I, and I don't, I don't mean to infer that that comment

25 I did not take place, because I believe it did.
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1 j

THE COURT:

2

MS. WISSLER:

But she did not [inaudible] But she did not apparently feel that it

3

was noteworthy or take - or feel that it, it apparently didn't

4

stick in her mind that there was a comment made about the dogs

5

biting someone. And so that's why I believe that under these

6

circumstances this conversation did not play a large part in

7

the statements that were made by Mr. Allred.

8

memorandum that I filed pretty specifically addresses the

9

issues of the custody status, or lack thereof, with regards to

I think that the

10

the first statement and also the issue of the subsequent

11

Mirandized statement and so I won't, I won't say too much. I

12

simply want to point out those two things which I think are

13

important to the Court.

14

THE COURT:

Do you see any problem with the coercive

15

aspects of the dog, or the reference to the dog?

I agree with

16

you the dog was not taken out, so I guess it's in some ways

17

commensurate with a gun that's in the holster and never

18

brandished or used, except that if one were to say look at this

19

gun I've got.

20

any time I want and I've shot people with it, that puts it in a

21

whole different situation.

22

a dog and that maybe we can get a certain dog by a certain name

23

because he's really a mean one, something like that indicating

24

that there are different dogs and some of them are meaner than

Look at this gun I've got, and I can take it out

What they said here was we can get

25 J others and so even though the dog was not there at the time,
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1

reference to the dog troubles me.

2

MS. WISSLER: And Your Honor, I, I, to be quite candid

3 j with the Court, I've told the officers involved in this case
4

that I would have preferred had this conversation not taken

5

place.

6

these kind of conversations happen.

7

discussed this case that there is any indication but for this

8

essentially their claims of coercion.

9

no implicit threat.

10

But I, because this type of situation arises where

THE COURT:

There was no, there was

There was no "if you don't own up to this,

this dog's gonna bite you."

11

I don't think, however, I

There was no dog present.

Well, I may be disagreeing with you on

12

that one.

I just wonder if that's sufficient to make it

13

coercive.

Because as you point out the dog was not there.

14

There's another statement, now I'm looking at Page

15

25, "I did mention to Officer Dimond about, well, let's see,

16

yeah I think I mentioned it to him that in the County I had

17

backed the County officer and their dog found drugs in the back

18

side of someone.

19

had found it, was sniffing at his back side." Now the only

20

reason to go into this nonsense about a dog nipping at

21

somebody's posterior and a dog being mean and looking for a

22

mean dog and asking for a certain dog by name is coercive.

I guess he put it down his pants and the dog

23

MS. WISSLER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. WISSLER:

Well and there was actually -

Because drugs had already been found.
There was actually not a discussion
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1
2
3

about one dog being meaner than the other.
THE COURT:

Well now, it was just what I read a

moment ago.

4

MS. WISSLER:

Right, and I agree with you.

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. WISSLER: Uh-huh (affirmative).

7

THE COURT:

I'm on Page 24.

"'And did you say something to Officer

8

Dimond or did Officer Dimond say something to you about yeah

9

maybe we should get a certain dog by a certain name, he's

10

really a mean one, something like that indicating that there

11

are different dogs and some of them are meaner?"

12

He says, "Well at first we thought about a canine

13

dog, a regular canine dog which sniffs at a, and then we

14

decided the bloodhound, which we recently got on the police

15

department would be better, because he could go off scent and

16

be able to point out which person."

17

questionable whether there was a reference to meaner.

18

MS. WISSLER:

So I guess it's

And I think that, it's important that

19

you note that, Your Honor, because that's the kind of dog that

20

actually appeared on the scene was a -

21

THE COURT: [inaudible] a canine —

22

MS. WISSLER:

23

THE COURT: All right.

24

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, may I just point out-

25

THE COURT:

Surely.

Not a drug dog.

1 I

MS. REMAL:

- another statement in that, on that same

2 J Page 25, line 9, the question I had asked is do you, "Did you
3

or Officer Dimond say something about one dog being meaner than

4

another?

5

something.

6

we've got the canine dogs and they are mean."

7

And the answer was "Probably, I think someone did say
I can't remember if it was me or him that said

MRS. WISSLER:

But that wasn't the kind of dog that

8

they were discussing bringing.

9

THE COURT:

Yes, I understand.

It would be nice had

10

that not been said.

It would make it such a cleaner case, so

11

much of a cleaner case.

12

where we need to threaten people.

13

and if we're going to trial on the 11th I have plenty of time

14

to give you an indication of where I stand on this.

15

telling you, this is not one of those cases where I'm

16

necessarily going to rule that it's not suppressible.

17

not determined that it is suppressible, but frankly it's on the

18

line.

19

I've spent time in Liberty Park myself.

20

I bike there.

21

if officers had come up to me and had started asking me

22

questions and threaten me with a dog and gone through my

23

personal effects, even though they would not have found drugs,

24

it's kind of a terrifying thing to contemplate and I'm not so

25

sure that the manner in which this is handled is guaranteed to

I don't think we live in a society
I'm going to consider this

I'm

I have

I don't like the way this is handled, and, you know,
I roller blade there.

I take my daughter there. We picnic there, and
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1

get to the truth in a fair and appropriate manner.

2

to think about it.

3

I'm going

Let me ask one more question and you may not know the

4

answer to this.

5

wanted to use in relation to where the picnic table was?

6
7

Where was the restroom that the young woman

MS. REMAL:

I didn't ask that question at the

preliminary hearing, so I don't know.

8

THE COURT:

Do you know?

9

MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred, I think -

10

THE COURT: Mr. Allred?

11

THE DEFENDANT: It was about from where, from where

12

the basketball court is, when you enter, the basketball court,

13

they've got some out, outlet restrooms and they're just about

14

25 yards,, maybe not even that far.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well I'm going to give this

16

considerable thought. Now I don't know if that changes your

17

decision about going on the 11th, because you're not going to

18

know what my ruling is until you come in on the 5th.

19

I'd be happy to tell you sooner, but we won't be here.

20

that change your position on that?

21

I mean
So does

MS. REMAL: It certainly makes probably more sense for

22

us to get the Court's ruling before we proceed, and again my

23

only hesitation is -

24

THE COURT:

I'll tell you right now, the first

25 J statement is not coming in.

The statement to Officer Dimond
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1

without the Miranda, this bag is mine, is not coming in.

2

what we're talking about now is whether the second statement

3

comes in and so that raises questions whether the first

4

statement came, the second statement and as I recall the law on

5

this, there has to be a significant passage of time between the

6

two.

7

isn't a taint and I'm not sure we've got that.

8

you visit for a minute with your client.

9

So if

They have to be sufficiently attenuated so that there
So why don't

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, do you have any sense of if

10

the worse happens and on the 11th my other case doesn't resolve

11

as I think it likely will, when the date would be after that?

12

THE COURT:

Well, I would guarantee because the

13

defendant is in custody that I'd get it on immediately.

14

[inaudible] here.

15

If we could not try this because Ms. Remal is in

16

front of Judge Hansen on the 11th, could we do this on the

17

18th?

18

COURT CLERK:

19

THE COURT:

20

We [inaudible]

Okay, what about the 20th?

Why couldn't

we do it on the 20th?

21

COURT CLERK: [inaudible]

22

THE COURT:

23

COURT CLERK:

24

THE COURT:

What about the 25th?
We could do it then.

We could do it the 25th.

So we're in the

25 I same month, we're just a few weeks away.
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1

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, let me say back to you what I

2

think I hear you saying, and that is that you think that this

3

is an important question that you feel like you need time to

4

consider it carefully.

5

THE COURT: I'll go further.

!

I'll say that I think

6

there is a good chance that if I allow any second statement

j

7

it'll be overturned on appeal and that's not my concern. My

8

concern is in doing the right thing.

9

referencing an appeal is that I think the case law, and I want

But what I mean by

10

to re-read everything and I want to look very closely at Ms.

11

Wissler's Memorandum that she's directly on point on a number

12

of these issues, I'm really concerned about the manner in which

13

this was handled and I think you know me well enough to know

14

that I don't usually say that.

15

or it's not suppressed. This is one I have not made up my mind

16

on, but there is a very good chance that it will be suppressed.

17

MS. REMAL:

I usually say it's suppressed

I guess my comment has to do with the

18

amount of time that you feel like you need to properly consider

19

it.

20

It seems like what you're saying is that THE COURT:

If the trial goes on Tuesday, then I will

21

do it over the weekend.

I'll give it the time it deserves,

22

whether it's my own time or time in the office here.

23

think it's an important issue and what I'd like to do, frankly,

24

is not only research it myself and look at it, but also have my

But I

25 j law clerk look at it too, because I think it's an important
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I

1 I issue and that's not going to happen if we go to trial Tuesday.
2

Ms. Wissler, let me ask you a question and perhaps

3

you could turn to the officer and ask him.

What is your

4

understanding of the time differential between Officer Dimond's

5

questioning of the defendant and Officer Evans Miranda and

6

questioning of the Defendant?

7

MS. WISSLER: I don't know, let me ask.

8 I

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, what I've indicated to Mr.

9

Allred is that I want the Court to have the time to do the

10

research and consider the question carefully, and because of

11

that it's my advice to him that he agree to the 11th date and

12

if my other case doesn't go away like I think it's likely too,

13

that we agree to the date on the 25th.

14

THE COURT: We'll write this down in pencil on both

15

days.

16

resolved on the, on the motion, and frankly, I feel better

17

about that.

18

decision.

19

question to Ms. Wissler.

20

officer if she wished to.

21

differential between conversation A and conversation B with the

22

Miranda was.

23
24
25 I

But he's assured of one date or the other if it isn't

I think it's more likely I'll make the correct

While you were visiting with your client I put a
I asked that she confer with her
I wanted to know what the time

Recognizing that it's hard to pinpoint these things,
do you have an approximate time?
MS. WISSLER:

Your Honor, the officer indicated that
42

he thinks it was between 15 and 20 minutes-

He indicated to me

the things that he did in between the time that Mr. Allred was
taken in custody and when he approached him again and had
mirandized him and then had the rest of that conversation and,
and he says he recalls it was between 15 to 20 minutes.
THE COURT:

Okay, and that was without having talked

to his colleague?
MS. WISSLER:

He indicated to me just now that he

went and talked to the third officer who had by then arrived
and they were having some discussion, and THE COURT:

So he talked to the officer with the dog,

but did he talk to Officer Dimond?
MS. WISSLER:

He indicates, Your Honor, that the

conversation he had with Officer Dimond regarded what was in
the bag, in terms of quantity [over talking]
THE COURT:

So he didn't say what the defendant had

said to him as you recall, he just said I found marijuana in
the bag and then went and visited with the officer with the
dog, 15 to 20 minutes passes and he had the conversation with
the defendant?
MS. WISSLER: Right.
THE COURT: All right, well, Ifm going to carefully
consider this and research the issue.

I don't think it's an

easy issue. You know, I understand that law enforcement
43

1

officers, even the very best ones, in circumstances where

2

they're trying to find out information that's important may use

3

a word or a phrase that when we look at in hindsight in the

4

Court seems very different.

5

but I am saying I certainly wish the reference to the dog and

6

the dog's personality had not been made.

7

I'm not as troubled about the lack of Miranda on the first

8

statement.

9

on the second statement, it's a question of whether the two

So I'm not faulting the officers,

That troubles me.

That's just out, and since the same stuff came in

10

were attenuated enough.

11

apparently the two officers that got the two statements didn't

12

do much talking and that there's 15 minutes and so it is not a

13

significant period of time. But there are a lot of issues and

14

I don't know whether this is a product of coercion, but that

15

certainly is a strong possibility.

16

It bodes well for the State that

So I will take the time I need.

In all likelihood I

17

won't rule for a week.

18

next Friday which means that I'll spend the weekend looking it

19

over, reading the case law and then I'll meet with my law clerk

20

on Tuesday and have her do some additional research and then

21

we'll process it together and do some kind of memorandum or

22

[inaudible].

23
24

I'll probably have a ruling for you

MS. REMAL: Would it be helpful if we set this for
pretrial Conference next Friday so that the Court can inform us

25 I and then 44

1

THE COURT: Sure.

2

MS, REMAL:

3

- I'll by then hopefully know what's

happening with my other case so we'll know -

4

THE COURT:

I think that's a great idea.

5

MS. REMAL:

- what -

6

THE COURT: And you can tell us which of the trial

7

dates you want to use if it's still looking like it's going to

8

trial.

9
10

MS. REMAL:

Okay.

THE COURT: And of course, what's going on with me

11

and my thought processes, etc., does not in any way impede

12

counsel visiting and arriving at an agreement.

13

Friday, the 8th and if you're hear first Lisa, we'll do it

14

first at 8:30 in the morning, assuming the jail brings up Mr,

15

Allred in a timely manner, we'll let him be first.

Okay, so next

16

Any other issues we need to discuss today?

17

MS. REMAL: I don't believe so.

18

THE COURT: Well, I think that gives you an extension

19

on your instructions, so you can have until Wednesday at five

20

to get the instructions in.

21

MS. REMAL: Okay.

22

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

23

Thank you, sir.

24

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)

25
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1 i

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 8, 2000

2

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

3 |

P R O C E E D I N G S

4 J

THE COURT:

That and we'll do it.

5

MS. REMAL:

On the last page, number 1 -

6

THE COURT: And Tracy Allred is the one that we were

7
8
9

going to Would you see if that's on my desk Michelle?

That's

the one I did some research on.

10

MS. REMAL:

11

THE COURT: All right, and Ms. Remal, refresh me, who

12

Correct, Your Honor.

from the State was handling -

13

MS. REMAL: Ms. Wissler.

14

MS. WISSLER:

15

THE COURT: Who?

16

MS. REMAL: Ms. Wissler, who's here.

17 J

THE COURT: Ms. Wissler.

18

It's me, Your Honor.

There she is. All right.

I had indicated that I would advise you today of my ruling and

19 I then see where that places us and I'm in a position to do that.
20

MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred isn't here, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

Yes, I remember Mr. Allred.

I have

22

looked long and hard at this issue.

I've had a law clerk

23

looking at it as well to give me another perspective.

24

Thank you.

25

And have made a determination, having read what I

26

consider to be the important law in this area, and I will just
1

1 ' indicate the proposed ruling that the defendant's first
2 I statement was obtained in violation and that I would keep it
i

3

out I'm going to adhere to,

4 ' first statement.

I'm not going to allow in the

However, I am going to find that that

5 j statement, although in violation of Miranda, because the
6 | defendant quite simply had not been Mirandized, was a voluntary
I
7 ' statement, wasn't coerced.

It wasn't in any way forced.

The

8

defendant, who's a very pleasant gentleman, did not register

9

any vehement complaints.

The dogs were not there.

So I find

10 j that that statement was voluntary and there's no constitutional
11 j violation.

Therefore, the tainted fruit doctrine does not

12 j apply or create problems in connection with the second
13

statement.
I have looked at the case of State

14

versus

Troyer,

and

I
15 I also Oregon versus

Elstad,

and it's my belief that where there

16 | is a Mirandized statement which is made subsequent to a
17 I statement obtained in violation of Miranda, the second
18 I mirandized statement is nevertheless admissible if the
19 I defendant gave the first statement freely and voluntarily.

The

20

Court in Troyer

21

Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warning

22

unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances

stated it is an unwarranted extension of

23 I calculated to undermine the suspects ability to exercise his
24 I free will so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent
25 I voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some
?

1 j indeterminate period.
2

(

So in this case the Court determines that the police

3 I officers comments about the mean dog do not rise to the level
4

of coercion, in fact I call them more sort of inane and

5

ridiculous, although highly improper, and they did not in any

6

way, to this Court's mind, and I base this upon statements of

7

the witness and also the totality of facts and circumstances, I

8

find that they did not in any way overcome the defendant's free

9

will and since the Court finds an absence of coercion or other

10

improper tactics, suppression of the second statement is denied

11

and will be allowed.

12

to in any way.

The first statement is not to be eluded

13

I also will talk at some point with counsel present

14

to law enforcement about the stupidity, if you will, of their

15

approach in bringing a dog to the scene and their ridiculous

16

statement about the dog.

17

the result of the dog, and the mere fact that he was in a

But to my mind, the statement was not

18 I vehicle at the scene at some point, although it's not clear
19 j whether that was at a, same time that the statement was made,
20

does not to my mind change anything, and the mere fact that

21

Miranda was not given during the first statement does not taint

22

that statement for the reasons given and both of the cases to

23

which I eluded find the same thing.

24

So the one statement will come in and you can

25

certainly argue, Ms. Remal, that, you know, the reference to

26

the dog and so forth was coercion or whatever else you think is
3

1

appropriate and knowing how good you are, you'll probably be

2 | able to do a lot with the facts.
3

;

4

But in any event, that is my

ruling and I'm gonna ask the State to do a written ruling
commensurate with the oral one I just read into the record.

5 |

Now this was also to be treated as a pretrial but I

i

6 j don't believe we have a trial date, do we?
7 J

MS. REMAL:

We do for Monday, Your Honor, yes.

8

THE COURT: Monday, okay, and are we going forward on

9 j that date?
10 I

MS. REMAL: Yes.

11 I

THE COURT: All right, and is there anything I should

12 I be aware of in terms of particular issues or problems that
13 I we've got in this case?
14 j

MS. REMAL:

The only thing that I'm aware of, Your

15 I Honor, let me first check and make sure you got the voir dire
16 ! and instructions that I sent over.

I brought another copy

17 | because I know sometimes they don't make it to the file.
18 j

THE COURT: Well, that was wisdom on your part,

!

19 | because I don't.

I'm sure you did bring them knowing you.

20 ] They have not made their way upstairs.
21

So if both sides had an

extra copy, we can copy them and return them to you.

22

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, if I may approach.

23

THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Remal. Are these extras?

24 I

MS. REMAL:

Yes, those are extras.

25

THE COURT:

Do you need them back?

26 I

MS. REMAL:

What, what was sent over was an original
4
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 001910371

-vs-

Judge LESLIE A. LEWIS

TRACY MICAH ALLRED,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed in the above-captioned matter,
came before this Court for hearing in the above-entitled matter on September 1, 2000.
Defendant was represented by counsel, Lisa Remal of Salt Lake Legal Defenders'
Association, and the State was represented by Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District
Attorney for Salt Lake County. The Court, having received and reviewed the memoranda
submitted by each party, and having heard evidence and argument, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On June 9, 2000, Officers Bruce Evans and Derek Dimond of the Salt Lake
City Police Department were on routine patrol in the Liberty Park area of Salt
Lake County.

2. The officers' purpose in patrolling that area was to look for gang activity and
drug activity.
3. Officers Evans and Dimond \\ ere traveling in a marked Salt Lake City Police
car.
4. Both officers were in uniform, consisting of black fatigue style pants, black
short sleeved collared shirts bearing the words "Salt Lake City Police Gang
Unit" in yellow letters on the shirt's back, and black shoes or boots.
5. Both officers were wearing standard issue duty belts, including firearms.
6. As the officers approached the basketball court area of Liberty Park, their
attention was drawn to six individuals seated on or near a picnic table.
7. As the officers' car passed, one of the six individuals seated at the table, a
person later identified as the defendant stood up and quickly shoved
something into his pocket, then turned away from the officers and sat down.
8. The basketball court area of Liberty Park is, and was on June 9, 2000, known
to both Officer Evans and Officer Dimond as an area in which narcotics
transactionsfrequentlyoccur.
9. Because of defendant's behavior, the officers stopped their vehicle and
approached the six people seated at or near the picnic table.
10. The group of six consisted of three males and three females, one of whom was
17-year old Sonia Ortiz.
11. Officers Evans and Dimond approached the group and inquired as to the
group collectively whether they had seen any drug activity in the area, and
explained to them the problems that have occurred there.
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12. Officer Evans conducted a brief pat down "Terryfrisk"of the defendant,
because he felt that he needed to make sure that defendant hadn't been
concealing a weapon when he was initially observed quickly putting an item
into his pocket.
13. The "Terryfrisk"revealed no weapons or contraband on defendant's person.
14. During their conversation with the officers, all six people present denied
seeing or participating in any drug activity.
15. The conversation continued for a short time. The six persons seated at the
table were never told that they were not free to leave, nor did any of those
persons make any effort to leave at that time.
16. The officers satisfied themselves that none of the six persons with whom they
had spoken were engaged in any illegal activity.
17. The entire exchange between the officers and the six persons at the picnic
table lasted between five and ten minutes.
18. As they were about to leave, one of the officers' attentions was drawn to a
black briefcase style bag located on the ground at one end of the table. The
bag was five to six feet from where the males, including the defendant, were
seated, and seemed to Officer Evans to be out of place.
19. Officer Evans picked up the bag and, without opening it, asked all six
individuals collectively whether the bag was theirs.
20. All six, including the defendant, responded in the negative.
21. Officer Evans noticed a couple of other people playing basketball, and he
inquired of them whether the bag was theirs. They indicated that it was not.

3
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22. Officer Evans checked the area to see whether there was anyone else that
could conceivably own the bag, but didn't see anyone else in the area.
23. Officer Dimond then opened the bag looking for identification in an attempt to
determine its owner.
24. There was no identification in the bag.
25. Officer Dimond did locate in the bag a couple of car stereos, some stereo
faceplates, a few screwdrivers, aflashlight,batteries, and a green leafy
substance that appeared to be, and subsequently tested at the Utah State Crime
Laboratory to be, Marijuana.
26. The marijuana was packaged in three separate plastic bags.
27. Also in the bag, officers located approximately 82 empty plastic baggies.
28. After the contents of the bag were discovered, the officers took each of the six
individuals, including the defendant, aside separately, and asked each one
whether he/she knew who owned the black bag.
29. Officer Evans asked each of the six people "can you come over and talk to
me," and then asked each whether they knew to whom the bag belonged.
30. These conversations took place 10-15 feet away from the other five people just far enough away that the officer believed the others could not hear.
31. Each of the six individuals denied knowing to whom the bag belonged.
32. Each of the six individuals-wasfreeto leave during the time he was
conducting the investigation as to ownership of the bag. He indicated, "I had
no reason to hold them."

4

33. Sonia Ortiz, however, at some point asked whether she and herfriendmight
go use the restroom on the other side of the basketball court. Officer Evans
denied her request, reasoning that he did not want the two to go together
because they would then have an opportunity to discuss the issue of the bag.
34. After each of the six people asked denied knowing to whom the bag belonged,
the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves about different
ways in which they might determine the bag's owner.
35. During that conversation, conducted within earshot of all six people, the
officers considered aloud whether they should calfin a K-9 unit.
36. As a pat of the discussion about the possibility of a K-9 unit, one of the*
officers made a comment about some of the police dogs being meaner than
others.
37. Officer Evans remarked that Salt Lake County had a dog that had nipped at a
suspects' backside because the dog had alerted on drugs located in the
suspect's pants:
38. The officers never indicated to any person that a dog would bite them if they
turned out to be the owner of the bag.
39.UlflWtwasBtf police dog present at the scene during the conversation about

40. BtftMhat then indicated to Officer Dimond that the bag belonged to him.
41. Defendant was then placed under arrest, and Officer Evans read defendant his
Miranda rights.

5

42. Post-Miranda, defendant described to Officer Evans the contents of the bag,
and the origin of those items. He indicated, among other things, that the green
leafy substance inside the bag was marijuana and that he had been selling
marijuana because he could not get a job.
43. Sometime around the time that defendant was arrested, Officer Serio arrived
at the scene with a police dog.
44. Officer Serio was driving a marked Salt Lake City Police car that did not bear
any markings identifying it as a K-9 unit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's initial statement to Officer Dimond, in which defendant

admitted to ownership of the black bag, was made without benefit of the Miranda
warnings, and is thus inadmissible at trial.
2.

However, defendant's initial statement admitting ownership, while

violative of Miranda, was made voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. In
the absence of such coercion on the part of law enforcement, there is no violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the "fruit of the poison
tree" doctrine does not apply.
3.

Defendant's post-Miranda statements are admissible pursuant to the

principles announced in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and State v. Trover,
910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). Specifically, the Court has examined whether "a simple
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise hisfreewill,
so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is

6

ineffective for some indeterminate period." Trover, 910 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Elstad,
470 U.S. at 309).
4.

In the instant case, although defendant's initial statement was made

without benefit of Miranda warnings, it was unaccompanied by actual coercion.
Therefore, the absence of Miranda prior to the initial statement does not sufficiently
taint the investigatory process so as to render ineffective the subsequent waiver.
5.

The defendant made a voluntary and informed waiver of his Miranda

rights before making the second statement.
6.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is

granted with respect to his initial, pre-Miranda statement admitting ownership of the
black bag in question, and denied as to defendant's post-Miranda statements
reaffirming ownership and describing the contents of the bag.

DATED this y < £ y of January, 2001.
BYTHEj^OURT:

-

lonorable LESLIE A. LEWIS
Read and approved as to form by:

LISA REMAL
Attorney for Defendant

7

e ^

Addendum E

V? Q

*»—w - ^ w* \w* #
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

: Case No. 001910371FS

Plaintiff
Volume I of II
v

:

TRACY MICAH ALLRED,
Defendant.

JURY TRIAL HELD SEPTEMBER 11 & 12, 2000
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 2 7 2001
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ORIGINAL
m=E&
CAROLYN ERICKSON,CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 E. Ellen Way

APR 2

3 2001

COURT OF APPEALS

1 J

THE COURT:

Okay, all right, fair enough.

2

Incidentally, Ms. Wissler, do you see any family members on a

3

jury list, or anyone -

4

MS. WISSLER: I don't have any family in Utah.

5

THE COURT: Anyone you know on a jury list?

6

MS. WISSLER:

7

I looked and I don't

recognize anybody.

8
9

No, nope.

MS. REMAL:

Sorry about the clothing snafu, but, but

you look good.

10

THE COURT: Yes, Michelle is about to give us an

11

update on which jurors are not present and, Chris, do you want

12

to go get the jurors, bring them up and keep them in that

13

little area between the glass and the other door as quickly as

14

possible.

15
16

COURT CLERK: Number 4, Cooper, was on her way so she
should be down there by now.

17

MS. REMAL: Okay.

18

COURT CLERK:

19

Number 12, Mark Kilter, is not here and

number 26, Elizabeth Swenson, is not here.

20

THE COURT: Well, that's a pretty good turn out.

21

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, there is one matter that I

22

think we need to put on the record that Ms. Wissler and I have

23

agreed to, but just so that the Court's aware of it. As the

24

Court is I'm sure aware from our Motion hearing, the bag in

25 J question contained what appears to be marijuana and ultimately
14

1 i was tested to be, as well as some other property which included
2 I car stereos and face plates from stereos.
3

It's my

understanding that Ms. Wissler has instructed her witnesses -

4 j

THE COURT:

Not to allude -

5 j

MS. REMAL:

- not to mention specifically what they

6

are.

I think what she's planning to do was simply ask them did

I
7

Mr. Allred explain the other property or, but not go into what

8

the property is or not go into what specifically what Mr.

9

Allred said about the other property.

10
11

THE COURT: Certainly seems like an appropriate way to!
handle it.

Is that your intention Ms. Allred [sic].

12

MS. WISSLER: It is.

13

THE COURT: Ms. Allred - Ms. Wissler?

14

MS. WISSLER: It is.

15

THE COURT: I wonder how many times I'll screw up

16

today.

17

MS. WISSLER:

And I did talk to them about that.

18

THE COURT: All right, and if you would, if you feel

19 I like you've got any police officers who are less likely to
20

follow instruction, your instincts will tell you then tell them

21

again, and if we get into a situation where it sounds like

22

we're going to say something stupid, raise your hand, stand up

23

and say may I have just a moment, Your Honor, and that would be

24

better than having a mistrial.

25 j

MS. WISSLER:

We actually did address that at the
15

1

A

Correct.

2

Q

So what do you do with the bag then?

3

A

I took a look inside to see if we could find any kind

j

4

of identification, anything like that, and located some, some

5

marijuana, quite a bit large quantity -

6

Q

Okay, let me -

7

MS. REMAL:

8

MS. WISSLER:

9

THE COURT:

The objection is sustained.

10

MS. REMAL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Q

Objection, foundation, Your Honor.
Let me stop you there.

(BY MS. WISSLER)

When you looked in this black bag,

initially what was the first thing you saw?
A

There was, there was some car stereos inside the bag.

There was a baggie of marijuana.
Q

Okay, stop you there. What did this baggie look

like?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I'd object on foundation.

18

Certainly I believe the officer could describe what he saw, but

19

I believe his conclusion -

20

THE WITNESS:

21

THE COURT:

Just, just a moment please.

22

MS. REMAL:

- he can't draw based on his lack of

23
24

I understand.

expertise.
THE COURT:

So at this point, Ms. Wissler, phrase the

25 I question, which I think you did, but even more clearly, calling
133

1

Dimond, you know, we don't know who this bag is.

2

you know, see if we can find something so we can return it to

3

the owner.

4

Q

5

We'd better,

Okay, and at some point Officer Dimond opened the

bag, is that right?

6

A

That's right.

7

Q

Did you have occasion to observe the contents of that

9

A

I did at a later time.

10

Q

Okay, how long after?

11

A

I'm not sure.

8

bag?

I believe it was close to the point.

12

I think it was after we had made the arrest or close to the

13

point where we made the arrest.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q

Okay, when you looked into that bag what did you

observe?
A

I observed a couple stereos, couple, some tools.

I

observed a couple baggies with green leafy substance inside.
Q

Okay, when you say a couple, do you remember exactly

how many there were?
A

There were two, two larger plastic baggies rolled up

21

and then there was three smaller, smaller baggies that

22

contained mar, -

23

Q

24

A

25 J

Q

Okay, was there anything else?
green leafy substance.
Sorry, didn't mean to interrupt you.

Was there
165

1 I anything else in that large black bag?
2

A

And then there was a whole bunch of empty baggies.

3

Q

How many is a whole bunch do you remember?

4

A

Eighty, I think around 82.

5

Q

Okay.

6
7

So what did you do after you opened this black

bag and found all this stuff?
A

Well, we asked, we, we questioned, asked the six

8

individuals, you know, did you see anybody with this bag?

9

you know who this bag belongs to?

I actually pulled each

10

person aside and said, Hey, can you come talk to me for a

11

minute?

12

anybody holding this bag?

13

said no.

14
15
16

Q

Do

Asked them did you see who had this bag?

Did you see

I went through all six and everybody

Okay, did any of these individuals ever make an

attempt to walk away from the table?
A

No.
!
II

17
18

Q
Did any of them indicate to you that they didn't want I
to talk to you?
j
t

19

A

No.

'
I

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

No.

22

Q

Okay.

Did any of them admit to owning the bag?

J

Now at some point after some conversation and

23

some further investigation, did you have occasion to arrest Mr.

24

Allred for the contents of this black bag?

25

A

We did.
166

I

1 I
2
3

Q

Okay.

Can you indicate please who placed Mr. Allred |

arrest?
A

I can't remember, we were both together and I can't
1

4

remember, Officer Dimond was talking and I can't remember if

5

he, if he did it.

I believe he might have.

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

I'm not sure.

8

Q

Did you, after he was arrested, have a conversation

9

with Mr. Allred?

10

A

I did.

11

Q

Do you recall whether he was handcuffed when you

12

initially made contact with him after his arrest?

13

A

I can't remember, I think he was.

14

Q

You think he was handcuffed?

15

A

Yeah, I think he was handcuffed.

16

Q

Okay, and what was the first thing that you did when

17

you approached Mr. Allred?

18

A

Umm.

19

Q

After he had been placed under arrest?

20

A

After he'd been placed?

I just told him I wanted to

21

ask him a few questions and I asked him if he had ever been

22

read his Miranda rights. He said yes.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

I said do you understand those?

He said yes.

Then I

25 J went through and explained what his rights were and asked if he
167

1

would like to talk to me.

2

Q

3

And what did he tell you when you asked if he wanted

to talk to you?

4

A

He said he would.

5

Q

He said he would?

6

Did you ask him specifically about

the black bag?

7

A

I did.

8

Q

What did he tell you about that bag?

9

A

He said the bag was his.

10

Q

Did he tell you anything specific about the green

11

leafy substance that we've been discussing today?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

What did he tell you about that?

14

A

He said that he had been selling marijuana for

15

approximately two months in the park.

16

marijuana because he's had a hard time finding work.

17

Q

18

He says he sells the

Did you have any conversation about the other items

in that black bag?

19

A

I did.

20

Q

And did Mr. Allred tell you anything about the origin

21

of those items?

22

A

He didn't.

23

Q

Okay.

24

1

Now you wear a gun as part of your uniform as «

does Officer Dimond, right?

25

A
I

Yes.
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1 ,

THE COURT: Okay.

2

MS. REMAL:

We know what we need to talk about -

3

THE COURT:

Why don't you do that?

4 i most pleasant for you to talk to him.
5

MS. REMAL:

7

THE COURT: All right.

8

MS. REMAL:

10

Would you like us to

step out?

6

9

Where would it be

We can talk [inaudible] -

Your Honor, there is another matter that

I'd like to make a record about/ and that is, Your Honor, that
I'm moving for a mistrial on two grounds.

11

You can sit down, [inaudible]

12

Your Honor, it was my understanding of the

13

stipulation between the State and myself this morning that we

14

placed on the record, that the State's witnesses were not going

15

to bring to the jury's attention the fact that there were car

16

stereos in the bag, State's Exhibit 1, and it's my recollection

17

that both Officer Dimond and Officer Evans did, in fact,

18

mention those. Although they did not specify anything about

19

Mr. Allred's statement in regard to those.

20

violation of our stipulation and, and further the stipulation

21

in my view at least was based on the fact that that's an

22

indication of some prior or other bad acts which I believe is

23

prohibited by Rule 404 and that was my reason for speaking with

24

Ms. Wissler about it.

25

I believe that's in

Secondly, Your Honor, I would move for a mistrial
224

1 ( based on the second ground and that is in Officer Evans'
2

testimony it was my recollection that he said when he was

3

describing Mr. Allred's being mirandized that Mr. - that

4 I Officer Evans testified he asked Mr. Allred have you ever been
5 I mirandized before.

Mr. Allred said, yes, and Officer Evans

6 J then followed up and something like so you understand what this
7

means.

8 I

THE COURT:

Oh.

9

MS. REMAL:

My objection to that, Your Honor, is that

10

makes it clear that Mr. Allred -

11

THE COURT:

I did not hear that.

12

MS. REMAL:

- has been arrested before.

13

THE COURT:

If that's what was said -

14

MS. WISSLER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. WISSLER:

17

And Your Honor I do Surely that was not said.
- I recall that testimony and in fact

that was the reference.

i
I
i
|

I would note, however, that there was |

j
18
19 I

20
21

no timely objection and there was no motion to strike.
THE COURT:

That's true.

I

There was no motion to

i
I

strike, no ability to clarify it because of that MS. REMAL:

[

And, Your Honor, may I respond to that?

I

22

I intentionally did not object because if I objected, that's

i

23
24

just going to bring it to the jury's attention even more.
THE COURT: Well, I understand it's strategic.

i

i

i

25 j

MS. REMAL: I tactically decided to make a motion for
225 '

1 I mistrial b a s e d o n the testimony rather than take the chance of
2|
3 j

T H E :OURT: : .nderstand -.ha':

4j
5
5

THE COURT

^irategi

:«- problem *s that when

y O U m a k e that strategy c determination and don't raise the

. 7 I issue, and certain 1^ ^ ou don' t raise it: in front of the jury
8 | inyw.n

/on .say Y O U nped a b r i e : -^cess and*

~: fact/ t *e di d
at tent i on

9 j

1 0 | and there are a number of ways i n which it can be handled by my
11

I: : .aki n :j sc m e k:i ri ::i of ::: i i rati ve statement.

12

incredibly stupid thing to have said a n d 1 mi ssed I t # which is

13

the oi: i ly good thing, b e c a u s e if 1 m i s s e d it, perhaps the jury

]4

::i id a s we] 1

however, an
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15
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THE COURT:

Okay, I don't think then it's the problem

that I initially saw it to be,

I know unfortunately what

Officer Evans meant and you know what Officer Evans meant. But
the jury has no way of knowing what Officer Evans meant and he
could have meant were you Mirandized a few minutes ago. It
does not necessarily allude to or reference another time and
another crime.
case.

He doesn't say were you Mirandized on another

Have you ever been arrested before?

charged with a crime before?

Have you ever been

He just says have you been

Mirandized before MS. REMAL: Before.
THE COURT:

Which could have been -

MS. REMAL:

That's what I recall.

THE COURT:

- in the last 15 minutes. Now we know

that there was no prior Miranda, but the jury has no way of
knowing that, and I would be willing to say to the jury that
when, I'll make some kind of curative statement if you'd like
me to. But I am inclined to deny the motion for a mistrial.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, it would not be my request

that the Court make any sort of curative statement.

In my

view, if any or all of the jurors did not notice that
statement, then that would simply bring it to their attention
and I'm, I'm concerned about that happening and frankly THE COURT:

What about a statement like this, Ms.

Remal, and excuse me for interrupting.

I should have let you
227

finish

" understand your point and it's well taken.

What
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1 I
2

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative), I don't know that
that, thank you, I don't know that that makes any difference.

3 I The rights referred to are Miranda rights.

I don't think

i
4 ! anyone could assume they're anything else.
5
6

MS. REMAL:

Do you?

I believe that most people in our

community are fully aware of what Miranda rights are.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. REMAL: And I, I think that as soon as that word |

9
10

Yes.

I know.

is said they, they understand that concept.
THE COURT:

The reason I would be mentioning it is

11

not because they don't understand the term, but in order to

12

have an opportunity to set the stage for going into this

13

business about how when officers work as a team and one does

14

one thing and one does another, sometimes they may ask the

15

suspect, "Has that already been taken care of?" So that it

16 I seems more innocuous.
17
18

I offer it as a possibility and that may be one of
the other things you want to discuss with the defendant.

19

MS. REMAL:

I think I would, Your Honor, if we could

20

have a few minutes to do that.

21

THE COURT:

22

have as much time as you wish.

23

MS. REMAL:

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

MS. WISSLER:

How much time would you like?

You may

I think we just need 10 minutes or less.

I'm sorry, are you prepared to rule on
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occur would be a brief description, of what was seen in the
2,30

1 I black bag, that there would be absolutely no inference or
2
3 |

follow-up on the potential source of the stereos.
So Ifm going to deny the motion for mistrial on that,

4

and in closing, the State may not allude to it.

The defense,

5

however, may allude to it.

6

it can help you and you can clean it up because the best thing,

7

the best possibility - and I remember this vividly - the

8

stipulation, I should have on my own motion probably ruled that

9

the stereo heads or whatever they were, were not even to be

If there's some way that you think

10

referenced as having been in the bag.

11

stipulation as I recall it.

12

discussed and consequently, it would have been cleaner had it

13

not been, but I see no violation in the stipulation.

14

MS. WISSLER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. WISSLER:

But that was not the

There was no reason for it to be

Your Honor?

Yes?
Your Honor, just for clarification, I

17

did make reference to the fact in my opening argument and/or

18

statement and planned to in my closing argument the fact simply

19

that Mr. Allred gave some indication to the officers of where

20

the property came from.

21

what you said, but I believe that that's relevant to this case-

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. WISSLER:

24
25 J

I would make mention of any part of

Where what property came from?
The stereos, the remainder of the

property in the bag.
THE COURT: And what did he say about it?
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M S . WISSLER:

1
2

stereos were stolen and specifically that he had stolen them,

3
4

H e , he told the officers that the

THE COURT:

But that is the subject of the

ouipUidClC"

5
6

prohibited m e from making

:larifv with Ycur Hcn:r,

7
" ; • ne '^, > ".:,a ::is •ommerr.5.

.:icsi'.; drgumenr, arjae

- -~ <~"'- ^11

urficei dOuut tub -.^w ^-!:P - •
10

The

~ ->v:aence

of the fact tha*-

was

in -

12
13

WISSLER:

. <a*.

That's .

14

: .ng t ::: the stereo -

15

W loSLiLK ;

16
17

i'HE C ^ 'FT:
reference t<~> wh „

., .^a / .

iou m a y -: ^ •, "»? - • "*. I red made

. -ms wprp i

different " h ; r. 3 = .1: 1

/

.

,. a , :escribed .

:.e

:escr:oti -r . w a s clear that he

19
w i -SLKF :

20
21

THE COI J R I" •

22

MS.

23

THE C0UR1

24
25

WISSLER:

1

:<ca v , ~ :\n

:j a * :" w a n t e d .

Bi i t no r e f e r e n c e

-

No.

"o stereo.
1>

11

I)I 1 1 m i

It 1 1

1 HIci'11"

1 1 in

! I! 1 11

word,
132

1 i
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

Yeah the word should never have

been mentioned.

3

MS. WISSLER:

4 ]

THE COURT: As to the issue of the, the other, that

5

No, not going to talk about it.

is to say have your rights ever been read to you before, do you

6 I want to speak to that issue?
7
8

MS. WISSLER:

Judge, only to say that I would be

happy to try and clean that up in my closing argument and just

9 J brush it, gloss over it and say as an abundance of caution he
10

Mirandized him, not knowing whether another officer had

11

Mirandized him or not and so he then read his rights and this

12

is what happened after that.

13
14

THE COURT:

Well, I think that's one way of handling

it.

15

And Ms. Rental, I'll ask you to consider that as well.

16

I'm also happy to try and do it in some way that's innocuous.

17

The way in which it was mentioned, and I will view the

18

videotape again tonight, sounds like it does not imply that

19

he's ever been arrested before or ever been in trouble before,

20

but because there are more than one, because there were more

21

than one police, there was more than one police officer present

22

he could well have been asking did the other officer Mirandize

23 I you.
24

Of course, those are not the exact words and, of course,

I would be delighted if we didn't have this issue to deal with.

25 J It was extraordinarily stupid statement and I would give
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i

;

anything had it not been made.

Especially in view of the fact

2

that we had lengthy argument on the very issue of whether we

3

could use the first statement because there had been no

4

Miranda, versus the second statement where there nat been. But

5

the jury does not know that.
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1 I
2

Having said that, let me give you some time to talk,
as much time as you need.

3 1

MS, REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor.

4

[Whereupon a recess was taken]

5

MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred is not going to testify.

We

6 I have, as I indicated, discussed that earlier and, and discussed
7 j that again briefly today and that is both of our decision.
8 I

Secondly, we would like the Court to make a statement

9 I to the jurors such as you suggested before about the reading of
10 I rights and indicating that sometimes officers will check with a
11

person and see if one of the officers have, have read the

12

rights or not to, to have that information before they do that,

13

or, you put it in a lot better that I did -

14
15

MS. WISSLER:

And Judge, if you would like to

reference the fact that I neglected to ask Officer Evans if he

16 I had had a conversation with Officer Dimond about that issue,
17

I'm happy to have you do that.

18

that I neglected to ask Officer Dimond, Did you guys have a

19

conversation about whether or not he'd been read his Miranda

20

rights?

21

however you want to handle it. But if you'd like to approach

22

it that way, I'm happy to have you do that.

And just to clarify that, that Officer Evans, would,

23
24
25

If you just want to tell them

THE COURT: Ms. Remal, would you like me to handle it
that way?
MS. REMAL:

I think I'd prefer rather than have you
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1 i presence and they all involve not facts but legal matters and
2 I go over things and that's what we did and so sorry if the last
3 ! break took a few more minutes than we anticipated.

But we made

i

i

4 ' good headway, and in fact we're almost done with the evidence
5 I in this case.
6

In occurred to me while I had you out there waiting

7

and while counsel was visiting about a couple of the legal

8

points that there are a lot of terms that we use when we do a

9

trial and even though I'm sure all of you have degrees or

10

college, we've got a very bright jury here, even so and even

11

given that on t.v. now you hear a lot about the legal system.

12

For some reason they find it more fascinating than those of us

13

involved in it do.

14

are kind of alien or unknown to many lay people and I just

15

wanted to allude to that.

16

But even so, there are a lot of terms that

Chain is one of those terms. Obviously, you know, if

17

you have a chain around your wrist that's different than what

18

was being discussed in here.

19

who has control of evidence to the next person who has control,

20

and that's a legal term that I just wanted to make sure you

21

understood.

22

Chain is a link from one person

We've talked about burden of proof and I'll talk

23 I about that more in the instructions that I give you on the law,
24

and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard in

25

any criminal case, and I'll define that at some length, because
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it's a concept that we grapple with and that is very i mportant.
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case is presumed to be innocent and these are important rights
and the other concepts are very important and so they7 re
reduced to what we call legal instructions and I will read
those when the trial is over.

There are about 30 of them, but

they're short, they don't take very long and then you'll take

j

them with you into the jury room and hopefully all the

!

questions I haven't answered about terms and what not will

I

i

become clear as you look at those.
Now, Ms, Wissler, tells me that she has one more

j

short witness and that's Officer Dimond, who's she's going to

|

call to the stand briefly as I understand it first thing in the j
l

morning and Ms. Remal has one brief witness who she will be

j

calling in the morning.
We could start at 8:30 or nine based upon your
preference. My guess is and I am guessing, we're not going to
have more than 30 minutes of testimony or 45 minutes maximum.
Do you think that's a fair statement?
MS. REMAL: I think that's fair.
THE COURT: And then after that bit of testimony, I
will instruct you on the law.

That takes about 30 minutes, and

then you'll hear closing arguments from counsel.
How long do you each anticipate or guess it will take
you on your closing?
MS. REMAL:

I would guess, Your Honor, no more than

20 minutes and very likely not that long.
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|

1 , know how important it is to make weighty decisions, which of
2

course in my job I have to make all day, every day, and I have

3

been so impressed with each of you and how conscientious and

4 I attentive you have been throughout.

I just want to tell you

5

there isn't one of you who has drifted off.

6

little hot in here even.

7

taken notes and paid very careful attention and it says a lot

8

about each of you and it says a lot about how the system works,

9

and I just wanted to thank you for that.

10

I know it's a

There isn't one of you who hasn't

Someone once said a jury is the conscience of the

11

community and as I look at each of you I know that is true, and

12

my friend, the alternate, Mr. Noble, I want you to order lunch.

13

We, we don't know whether you'll be eating with the other

14

jurors, but you'll be eating, and so we'll see how it goes

15

tomorrow and I look forward to seeing each of you in the

16

morning at 8:45.

Any questions?

17

JUROR ?:

18

THE COURT:

Yes.

Is that here or in the jury room?
In the jury room, and then Chris will

19

bring you in here, you know, five minutes or so after you get

20

here, and remember don't watch the news tonight.

21

giving you a little break from the war in the middle east and

22

all of the other things going on in the world that sometimes

23

we'd rather not know about. And don't look at the newspapers.

24

While it is my perception that this is not a high profile case,

25

again you never know.

Consider it

There may be articles treating generic
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SONYA ORTIZ
having been duly sworn, testified
upon her oath as follows:
Direct Examination
THE COURT:

Thank you Ms. Remal.

And Ms. Ortiz, it's important that you lean into the
mic and speak as loudly as you can.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. REMAL:
Q

Sonja, would you just state your name for us and

spell your last name?
A

Okay. Sonja Ortiz. O-R-T-I-Z.

Q

Sonja, where do you live?

j

A

On -

I
i

THE COURT: Miss Remal, could you just get a spelling
on the first name as well -

!
|

Q

MS. REMAL:

Sure.

THE COURT:

- since there are a couple of alternates? !

(BY MS. REMAL)

j

Sure, spell your first name for us
I

also.
A

Okay, S-O-N-Y-A.

!

Q

Where do you live, Sonya?

j

A

On 1749 South 900 East?

!

Q

And how old are you?
i

A

Seventeen.
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Q

Sonya, I want to draw your attention to the afternoon

or early evening of June 9ch of this year.

Do you recall being

at Liberty Park?
A

Yes.

Q

And do you recall if you were with anybody or were

you by yourself?
A

I was with two of my friends.

Q

And what are their names?

A

Crystal and Megan.

Q

And THE COURT:

I'm sorry, one more time.

THE WITNESS:

Crystal and Megan.

THE COURT: Chris?
THE WITNESS: Crystal.
THE COURT:

Crystal?

THE WITNESS: And Megan.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay, thank you.

(BY MS. REMAL)

Why don't you try to move the

microphone just a little bit closer to you?

We want to make

sure everyone can hear you.
Do you remember about what time you went to the park?
A

It was probably after seven.

Q

And when you got to the park, tell us what you did.

A

Just walked around.

Q

Was there a time when you started talking to some
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other people in the park?
A

Later on.

Q

And who were these other people you started talking

A

A group of guys.

Q

Did you know any of those guys before or was that the

to?

first time you met them?
A

The first time I had met them.

Q

Can you remember how many guys there were?

A

At least five.

Q

And can you tell us whereabouts in Liberty Park that

happened?
A

By the basketball courts.

Q

And was there something there for you to sit on, or

did you just stand up?
A

A table.

Q

What kind of a table was it?

A

Like a picnic table.

Q

And do you recognize anybody here in the courtroom

today as being one of those guys that you talked to?
A

Right there.

Q

All right, can you [inaudible]THE COURT:

For the record, Ms. Remal, let me just

indicate she's identified the defendant.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL)

Did you ever find out what this young
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1 i man's name was?
2

A

Tracy.

3 I

Q

And did you talk to him among the other guys that

4 | were there?
5 |

A

Not really.

6 J

Q

So you didn't talk to him yourself?

7

A

Huh-uh.

8

Q

Ok.

9

[negative]

Is that a no?

Can I ask you to say yes or no,

it makes it -

10 I

A

No.

11

Q

- a little bit more understandable.

12

A

Okay.

13

Q

How long did you and your girlfriends talk to these

14

Thank you.

guys before something else happened?

15

A

We were there probably 15, 20 minutes.

16

Q

And was there a time while you were there by the

17

picnic table that some police officers came over to you?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And do you remember how many police officers there

21 I

A

Just two.

22

Q

Have you seen any of those police officers here in

20 I were?

23 J court today?
24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Can you see any of them here right now?

i
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A

Yeah.

Q

Can you point to that police officer for us?

A

Right there.
THE COURT: And for the record, it looks like

Detective Evans has been identified.
MS. REMAL:
Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MS. REMAL)

Do you remember how the two police

officers were dressed that day at Liberty Park?
A

I think they were in uniform.

Q

Can you remember whether you saw how they got there,

to the park?
A

[inaudible]

Q

Did you notice if they were in a car?

A

In a police car, yeah.

Q

Do you remember if it was a regular police car that

says police on the side of it?
A

Yeah.

Q

What were the police doing the first time you became

aware that they were there?
A

They had approached us and...

Q

And what happened as they approached you?

A

They had asked us some questions.

Q

Now, when the police got over to where you were, were

all the same people there as you were talking to before?
A

No.
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1 I

Q

What happened to some of them?

2

A

They walked away, they left.

3

Q

How many people were still there when the police

4 j officers got there?
5

A

I think like, five or six.

6

Q

And were you and your two girlfriends among those

7

five or six?

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q

And who else was still there?

10

A

Tracy and two other guys.

11

Q

You said the police officers asked you some questions

12

when they got over to you.

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Can you remember what questions they asked?

15

A

They asked us if we had seen a drug deal or were

j
!
!

16

involved in one.

17

Q

And what was the response to that question?

18

A

We told then that we didn't know what they were

19

I

j

talking about.

!

20

Q

And what happened after that?

'

21

A

They told us that they had received a phone call and |
t

22

indicated that there was a drug deal going on. And so...

23 j

Q

And what happened after they told you that?

24

A

They kind of looked around and they found the bag.

25 j

Q

Now, at any point did the police officers ask you

I

I
!
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1

your name or for identification?
A

Yeah,

Q

Can you remember when that happened?

A

Afterwards.

Q

And what did you and your friends do in response to

them asking for your names and identification?
A

We gave them our names and our addresses and...

Q

Did the police officers tell you what they were doing

with that information, why they asked that?
A

Yes.

Q

What did they say?

A

They said that they wanted to know where we were in

case they had questions for us later.
Q

Now, you said something about them finding the black

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Describe to me what you remember about them finding

bag.

the black bag.
A

The found the black bag and then they asked who it

belonged to.
Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

And nobody seemed to know who it belonged to, so they

kind of opened it and searched through it.
Q

Now, when they were asking who knew anything about

the black bag what were you and the other kids doing?

Where
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1 ' were you?
2

A

We were just sitting on the table still.

3

Q

Did the police officers, at first, ask you together

4

as a group about the black bag, or -

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

At any point did they ask you one by one about the

7

'

bag?
1

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

When did that happen?

10

A

Nobody admitted to knowing anything about the bag so,

11
12
13

then they questioned us individually.
Q

And describe to me how that happened.

Where did they

- how dieI they get you individually?

14

A

15

while away.

16

Q

17

!

They pulled us off one by one and went quite a little ,

And then after you were done talking with the police

officer one by one then, then what happened?

j

18

A

We just went back to the table.

|

19

Q

Okay.

1

Now, was there ever a time that the police

i
i

20

officers searched all of you?

21

A

Yes-

22

Q

When did that happen?

|

23

A

After they had searched the black bag and they had

1

24
25

!

asked us who it belonged to.
Q

Describe to me what you remember about being
i
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searched.
A

They just told us to empty our pockets and they

searched through me and my friends purses.
Q

Now, was there a time when you tried to leave the

picnic table for some reason?
A

We asked to use the restroom and to get a drink of

water.
Q

And who we?

A

Me and one of my friends.

Q

And who were you asking for that permission from?

A

Both of them.

Q

And what did the police officers say?

A

They told us that we weren't allowed to leave yet.

Q

Now, did the police officers ever indicate to you

what was inside the bag, the black bag?
A

They pulled it out in front of everyone.

Q

And what - did you notice seeing something that was

sort of a vegetable material, a green leafy substance?
A

Yeah.

Q

And do you remember where they were when they pulled

it out?
A

Where the officers were?

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

On the picnic table.

Q

Did they actually take out that green leafy substance
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and put it on the table?
A

Yeah.

Q

Now, do you remember the police officers ever saying

to you what they do if nobody said the bag was theirs?
A

They said that we'd all get tickets for possession of

marijuana. And we'd probably all have to go to court for it.
Q

Can you remember when it was that they said that?

;
I
j
i

A

After they had questioned us and nobody still said

anything about the black bag.
Q

j

Can you remember if the police officers said anything j
i

about police dogs?
A

They said that they were bringing in their dogs to

sniff out - to see if any of us had had anything to do with the i
items in the bag.

•

Q

And did you ever see any police dogs?

|

A

They brought them, but they didn't - they let us go

,

before they took them out of the car.
Q

'

Okay. Now, did you know that Tracy got arrested that |

day?

I
A

Yes.

Q

Did you see that happen?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And after he got arrested was he taken away from

'

\

Liberty Park?
A

|

Yes.
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1 i

Q

Did you see how that happened?

2

A

They just drove him away.

3

Q

Now, after Tracy was gone did you stay there at

4 | Liberty Park or what did you do?
5 j

A

We stood there till, like, 10, 11:00 that night.

6 |

Q

Okay.

7

And when you say we stayed there, who else

besides you?

8

A

Just me and my two girlfriends.

9

Q

Did anybody else that you had talked to previously

10

come and talk to you after Tracy was gone?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Who was that?

13

A

One of the guys that had first called us over had

14

come back about an hour, hour and a half later.

15

Q

An hour and a half later after what?

16

A

After the police had left.

17

Q

And did you ever find out that person's name?

18

A

I think it was Clay.

19

Q

And what makes you think it was Clay?

20

A

Cause earlier that's the name that he had given me

21
22
23

and two of my friends.
Q

Now, was Clay there when the police officers had been

there before?

24 j

A

He was one of the guys that had left.

25

Q

And when Clay came back did he notice that the black
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bag was gone?
MS. WISSLER:
Your Honor.

Not applying personal knowledge.

THE COURT:
Q

Objection to what someone else noticed,

Sustained.

[BY MS. REMAL] Did Clay indicate whether or not he

noticed that the bag was gone?
MS. WISSLER:

Objection, calls for hearsay.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I don't believe that it calls

for hearsay.

At this point I'm asking her a yes or no.

THE COURT: All right.

Rephrase - say it again, if

you would please.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL) Was there something - and I want you

to just answer this yes or no. Was there something that Clay
said that indicated whether he noticed the bag was gone or not.
A

Yes.
THE COURT:

Q

You can answer that yes or no.

(BY MS. REMAL)

Did Clay - what was Clay's demeanor

when he came back?
A

He was angry.

Q

And did he say something about why he was angry?
THE COURT:

That can be answered yes or no.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL)

What did he say about why he was

angry?
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1 i

MS. WISSLER:

2

MS. REMAL:

Objection, calls for hearsay,
Your Honor, I believe that it is an

3 I excited utterance, it has to - it relates specifically to the
4 ! reason that he was angry, and I believe that that clearly fits
5

within the excited utterance.

6

(Whereupon a sidebar was held)

7 I
8

MS. REMAL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I have no further

questions of Ms. Ortiz, but Ms. Wissler may have some

9 I questions.
10

THE COURT:

11

All right, cross examination?
CROSS EXAMINATION

12

BY MS. WISSLER:

13

Q

Ms. Ortiz, you indicated that you were at the park -

14

at Liberty Park, on June 9th and you got there about seven

15

o'clock;

16

A

17

is that right?

I

Around there.

I
j
j

THE COURT:

You need to answer -

I

i

18 j
19 |

THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q

(BY MS. WISSLER)

j
And you think you talked to these

|

I

l

20

three guys, or five guys that were there for how long, before

j

21

the police officers arrived?

!

22

A

Fifteen to 20 minutes.

j
i

23
24

Q
So what's your best recollection of what time it was ,
when the police officers arrived, if you know?
'
i

25

i

A

I'm not sure.
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1 ,
2

Q

Okay.

And you - it's your testimony that you had not

met Mr. Allred before June 9th;

is that right?

3 I

A

4

Q

And have you talked to him since then?

5 I

A

No.

6

Q

You indicated that at some point during the incident

7

Yes.

you saw a police dog or some police dogs;

is that right?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Do you remember how many dogs you saw?

10

A

I'm pretty sure it was just one.

11

Q

Do you remember what kind of dog that was or do you

12

know what kind of dog it was?

13

A

I have no idea.

14

Q

How far away were you when you saw the dog?

15

A

Like, 10 feet.

16 I

Q

Okay. And you - but you don't know what kind of dog

17

it is -

18

A

Huh-uh.

[negative]

19

Q

- was.

20

A

No.

21

Q

You indicated to Ms. Remal just a while ago that the

22

officers told you that if you didn't tell them whose bag it was

23

you were all going to get tickets for possession of marijuana;

24

is that what you said?

25

A

Yeah.
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Q

Do you recall testifying in a motion - or in a

previous hearing in this case on September l3t?
A

Yes.

Q

Was that - that was in this courtroom;

is that

right?
A

Yes.

Q

And that was in front of Judge Lewis?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Do you remember Ms. Remal asking you some

questions along these same lines that she asked you questions
about today?
A

Yes.

Q

And you didn' t say anything on September l3t about

the officers telling you that you were going to get a ticket,
did you?
A

I think I did.

Q

Okay, you think that you testified on September l3t

that they officers told you that you were going to get a
ticket?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

Do you also recall testifying on September 1'

about the issue of the conversation involving the dog?
A

Yeah.

Q

Between the two officers;

A

Yes.

is that right?
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1 i
2

Q

Did the officers ever say anything to you - to you

specifically about the dog?

3 ]

A

No.

4 j

Q

Okay.

And you testified again today about the

5 I conversation about the dog;

is that right?

6 I

A

Yes.

7

Q

Okay. And it's your testimony, is it not, that the

8

officers told you that they were going to bring the dog in, and

9

that the dog would be able to sense it if you had any

10
11

involvement in the bag;
A

12
13

is that correct?

Yes.
MS. WISSLER:

Thank you, I have not other questions,

Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Ms. Remal, anything further?

15

MS. REMAL:

Nothing further of this witness.

16

THE COURT:

Let me get counsel to approach again.

17

[Whereupon a sidebar was held.]

18

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20

BY MS. REMAL:
Q

Sonya, I'm going to ask you just a few more

21

questions. After Tracy had been taken away from Liberty Park,

22

you indicated that someone named Clay came back over to where

23

you and your girlfriends were.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Can you tell us what you observed about Clay that
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made you think he was angry?
A

He was yelling and swearing, and he was just pretty

much mad.
Q

And did his yelling and swearing and being mad relate

to the black bag?
A

Yes.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, may I approach the witness?

THE COURT: Yeah.
Q

(BY MS. REMAL)

Let me show you what's previously

been admitted as States number 1, and ask you if that is
recognizable to you at all.
A

Yes.

Q

What does that look like to you?

A

That looks like the black bag that was there.
MS. REMAL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I don't have any

further questions [inaudible].
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wissler, did you have
anything further?
MS. WISSLER:

Yes, Your Honor.

Just briefly.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MS. WISSLER:
Q

Ms. Ortiz, had you ever met this Clay before June

A

No.

Q

Had you ever talked with him?

9th?
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1 I

A

No.

2

Q

You don't know his last name;

3 I

A

Huh-uh [negative].

4 J

Q

Don't know where he lives?

5

A

Nope.

6

Q

Don't know anything about him other than he said his

7
8

name was Clay;
A

9
10

is that right?

is that right?

Right.
MS. WISSLER:

Okay.

Thanks, I have no further

questions.

11

THE COURT: All right.

I'm going to ask the jury to

12

step out again for a moment/ and I hope the donuts are there.

13

And please don't discuss the case.

14

minutes.

It'll just be about five

15

[Whereupon the jury left the courtroom]

16

THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, you may be seated.

17

Did you

testify at the preliminary hearing?

18

THE WITNESS: What's [inaudible].

19

THE COURT:

That means another courtroom where

20

another judge was present and you were asked questions. Did

21

you testify in such a courtroom?

22

THE WITNESS: No.

23

THE COURT: All right, so the first time you ever

24

testified or talked under oath was in the hearing before me;

25

is that right?
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THE WITNESS: Yes,
THE COURT:

Why didn't you mention Clay then?

THE WITNESS:

In my memory I think I mentioned him

[inaudible].
THE COURT:

Oh, no.

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, just -

THE WITNESS:
MS. REMAL:

You did not.

I-

To clarify, I believe that she did

mention Clay as one of the people she met.

I don't believe

that she testified and wasn't asked about this incident later
on.
THE COURT: All right.
name Clay.

Perhaps you mentioned the

I do not remember that. And I took notes because I

had to rule on a motion.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT:

Why didn't you mention this alleged

statement that Clay made?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I wasn't asked.

Had anyone told you not to discuss it?

THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT:

Didn't you think that was an important

thing to get out?
THE WITNESS:

I told the detective or investigator

that had come to my house.
THE COURT: What detective that had come to your
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house?
THE WITNESS:

He's sitting over there.

MS. REMAL: Mr. Couch had interviewed her, Your
Honor, when we found her pursuant to notes that we got from
Officer Evans.
THE COURT:

But you didn't tell the two detectives

that were at the park.
THE WITNESS:

Well, they had left before Clay came

back.
THE COURT: And you didn't call on the phone to the
police headquarters and ask for them by name and tell them?
THE WITNESS:

I didn't know their names.

They said

that they'd be in touch with us.
THE COURT: And you didn't tell Clay to contact the
police department?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT:

Is that a no?

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:

You may stand down.

I'm going to let you make a record of your motion and
let Ms. Wissler respond.

You know, one of the things that I

find extraordinarily difficult to accept, to understand and to
deal with is surprises in the courtroom.

The law in real

trials are not meant to be like Parry Mason, where pieces of
evidence or newly discovered crap - or crap's the wrong word -
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1

data, is pulled out at the last minute taking everybody by

2

surprise.
i

3 J
4

Obviously, if the State did that there would be a
motion for a mistrial, and it would be considered evidence that

5 ' was essential and the failure to provide the same would be
considered unethical, etc, etc.
Different rules apply to the defense, I'm well aware
of that. And I'm also well aware that Ms. Remal would never do
anything unethical.

However, I have some concerns that letting

in information that the State has not had an opportunity to
deal with or prepare for, certainly it raises the question of
why.

If Detective Couch was able to get this information, it

was not available to the detective in this case, I guess the
answer is that they were never aware of Clay because the
defendant didn't tell them, and Sonya didn't tell them.
was not present when they were at the park.

And he

But it seems to me

critical enough information that if it had been given to the
State t,hings might have been handled differently in a lot of
ways.

Isn't that true Ms. Wissler?
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Certainly.
Do you want to talk about what you

understand the rule on site of evidence to be Ms. Remal?
MS. REMAL:

Yes, I do. And let me respond, if I

might, to what The Court just said, for the record.

And that

is, it is certainly my understanding that the rules are
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1

different for the defense than they are for the State.

The

2 i State did not do a motion for discovery asking for information
3

from the Defense. And frankly, had they done so, I would have
i

4

responded with an argument and memorandum that Mr. Allred has a

5 ' right against self incrimination, which is broader than just
6 j him not being required to answer questions. And that I would
have felt that it's not constitutionally appropriate for a
7
8
9

Defendant to be required to give evidence to the State.
The way we discovered Ms. Ortiz at all was that at

10

the preliminary hearing Officer Evans testified that although

11

he didn't have the names of these individuals, that he spoke

12

to, in his report - in his police report - that he believed he

13

had notes somewhere at the police department which contained

14

the names of the individual. And in fact he did, in pursuance

15

to subpoena I obtained those.

16

interview the people if he could find them,

17

license checks and obtaining Ms. Ortiz's address, that's how he

18

was able to obtain the information about how to contact her

19

and, in fact, did contact her.

20 ]

I then asked Mr. Couch to
Through drivers

I did not ask her about Clay and his exclamation

21

about the bag at the motion to suppress because it wasn't

22

relevant to that.

And she -

23

THE COURT:

Oh, I think it was highly relevant.

24

MS. REMAL:

Well, in my view it's not relevant, Your

25

Honor, and in my view it is -
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THE COURT:
different ruling.

It might have resulted in a totally

If your argument is that someone is being

coerced, and you've got someone who's going to say that another
individual said in an angry tone, that was my bag, that's
relevant to a motion to suppress, highly relevant.
MS. REMAL:

Well, I apologize -

THE COURT:

Well, no -

MS. REMAL:

- for not relaying that because it might

THE COURT:

I don't think it's -

MS. REMAL:

It wasn't.

be with -

THE COURT: Apology material.

I think it's tactical

and your aloud to proceed in a manner that you deem
appropriate.

I have absolutely no concerns about your ethics.

Never have had.

You're an excellent lawyer, and I think if you

choose to handle things tactically in a certain manner that's
an appropriate choice.
My concern is, given that choice and the fact that
obviously the information was available, the State could have
asked for it. But if they'd asked for it in written discovery,
as you point out, it would have been pointless. And the only
other way they could have done it is to re-interview Sonya,
which, in hindsight, should have been done but would be hard to
predict.

So what we've got is a situation where we have a

person with a first name and no last name, who may or may not
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1

exist.

2

individual.

3

We don't know because we haven't ever seen this
You don't have an address for him, a phone number?

MS. REMAL:

No, we have no more information other

4 i than what Ms. Ortiz testified to.
5
6

THE COURT:

So, we're not looking at a live witness

who can be put before the jury, and cross examined.

So the

|
l

7
State has not right to cross examination.

There is no

,

8
impediment to his testifying, that we're aware of, except that

!

his last name hasn't been given. And I suppose if he's a

^

9
10
friend of the defendant the defendant would know his last name* |
11

i

And if the defendant -

[

12

I
i

13
14
15
16

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor -

i

THE COURT:

Just a minute, let me finish my thought, |

i
i

If the defendant is going to accept the responsibility

;
!

argumendo, for somebody else's property, that puts him in a
I
position where he's going to be arrested I think one would have '
i

17

i

to assume that would be a friend.

You don't do it for a

i
i

18
19
20

stranger. And that being the case, my guess is, either the

j

person doesn't exist or the person does exist and the defendant '

21

knows his last name. But the last name has not been provided, !
And the person has not been brought in. So the State, it seems [

22

to me, is being deprived of the right to confirm him, to cross .

23

examine him, and that concerns me. And I'm going to listen to ,

24

what you have to say about spontaneous utterance, but the

25

thread that runs all the way through hearsay and all the

i

J
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hearsay rules, is inherent reliability.
The reason we allow spontaneous utterances, under
some circumstances, when they're truly spontaneous, is because
there is an inherent reliability-

If someone's hand is cut and

they see blood dripping and they say, Oh my god, you must have
cut me.

That's because it's inherently reliable.

Because it

occurs without one thinking about it, it's spontaneous based
upon some extreme emotion or some physical sensation or
whatever.
The other exceptions to the hearsay rule are also
allowed because there's an inherent reliability.
where's the inherent reliability?

In this case

We don't know the last name

of this individual, the information has not been provided to
the State. We still have no data about why this man isn't
here, or where he is, or who he is. And the only thing we've
got is a 17 year old girl who doesn't know his last name, who's
going to make some statement about the bag, that apparently he
made.

And I don't see any reliability in that.

There's

nothing to support it. Nothing to corroborate it. The
defendant, in his statement to the police, never eluded to any
Clay, that I'm aware of.
Did he, officer?
OFFICER COUCH: No.
THE COURT: Was he asked any questions, Officer,
about whether or not the bag belonged to anyone else?
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1 i

OFFICER COUCH: No.

2

THE COURT:

3

But he was asked to whom the bag

belonged?

4

OFFICER COUCH: Yes.

5

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Remal, I'm happy to hear

6
7

your argument.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, of course I'm - as I've

8

indicated earlier, relying on Rule 803 subsection 2 which is

9

entitled excited uttering.

In Rule 803 at the very beginning

10

before siting all of the subsections - well, at the very top it

11

says, Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, availability of declaring

12

immaterial.

13

declarant being unavailable.

14

whether the declarant is available or not available. And so,

15

it's not required that the declarant be available in order to

16

be cross examined by the party of [inaudible].

17
18

There is a separate rule which talks about
With 803, it doesn't matter

In my view - and let me, for the record, although we
indicated that this is the bench in case this wasn't loud

19 J enough for the record to hear, it - I anticipate that if Ms.
20

Ortiz were aloud to be asked, what did Clay say, he response

I
i

i

21

would be "The bag was mine.

That stuff was mine." And in my

|

22

view, that fits exactly into the dictates of excited utterance, i

23

which states, a statement relating to a startling event or

24

condition made while the declarant was under the stress of

25

excitement caused by the event or the condition.

I

The event or
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the condition in this case is the black bag being gone. And
the statement about the black bag is immediately following that
and relates to the condition of the black bag being gone, and
the statement is, the black bag was mine.
THE COURT:

Well, first of all, can you refresh me?

I don't recall her saying when it was in relation to when the
defendant had left. But my understanding is she stayed till 11
p.m. or midnight and that this person came back some time
later.
MS. REMAL: My understanding is that it was about an
hour or an hour and half later.
THE COURT: All right [inaudible].
MS. REMAL:

But the event that I'm talking about is

Clays discovery that the bag was gone.
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
MS. REMAL:

Which happened immediately prior to his

statement claiming ownership of the bag. And so in my view it
fits precisely within excited utterance and the declarant
doesn't need to be available. And as I previously indicated,
we have no more further information about Clay.
THE COURT:
available either.

I don't think the declarant needs to be

I just think that that is one of the factors

that I can consider.

It's not a definitive factor, but it's

one of many in determining how reliable this is. The fact that
there was no last name.

The fact that he's not here to
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testify.

The fact that we have no other information about him,

goes to the issue, it seems to me, of whether or not it's
inherently reliable and credible information which underlines,
as I said before, all the hearsay exceptions.
Was there anything else you wanted to say on that?
MS. REMAL:

Just to respond to that, Your Honor.

Respectfully, I disagree with the Court that you need to
balance those factors. My reading of Rule 803 is that you look
at the rule, you determine that parameters of the rule and if
the statement fits within one the exceptions then it's
admissible without requiring the Court to look to other factors
to determine it's reliability.

That the fact, in my view, that

it fits within the exception means that our legislature, in
adopting this rule of evidence, has determined already that
that's sufficient reliability for it to be admissble.
THE COURT: And my understanding, clearly, is that
the hearsay rule, in all of it's aspects, is predicated upon
inherent reliability.
basis.

Each of the exceptions has that as the

There is, in fact, one catch-all exception that talks

about all of the indicia showing inherent reliability.

But all

of them, even the ones that don't use that language require
that that be part of it. And we don't even have a last name.
Ms. Wissler, would you like to respond?
MS. WISSLER:

Just briefly, Your Honor. As first of

all, I think there's a problem foundationally speaking, if you

298

will.

Ms. Ortiz testified today that she had never met this

Clay person before.
name.

She's not even sure that that's his real

She just knows that's the name that he gave her. We

don't know his last name obviously.
THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, will you step out please?
Perhaps Detective Couch or someone else can step out with you.
Don't want you to leave.
Excuse me, go ahead.
MS. WISSLER:

That's okay.

We just know that's the

name that he gave her. We don't know if he was being truthful
or what. We don't know his last name, we don't know anything
about him.
We also don't know whether any of her observations
about him were accurate.

She had never met this person before.

She has not spoken to him since.

So her analysis of his state

of mind may be completely wrong.

She's not in a position to

give an opinion as to whether he was angry or happy.

She can

say he was yelling and swearing, and she did say that.
But for - to predicate and exception to hearsay
requirement - or a hearsay rule, on her observations of someone
that she doesn't even know, seems to me to be ludicrous. I
mean, it seems to me that the rule requires that there be some
objective indication that this person really truly was under
this emotional strain or under [inaudible]THE COURT:

You're saying that in order to assess the
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emotional stress or strain or what a persons demeanor was,
you'd have to have seen them on more than one occasion to see
what was normal for them.
MS. WISSLER:

Is that -

Exactly, we have no base line. We

don't know what this person behaves like normally.

We don't

know what his natural demeanor is. We don't know whether, like
I said, whether her assessment of his state of mind is even
accurate.

And so to predicate this extremely unreliable

hearsay statement upon her observations of a person she had
never met before seems to me to add additional unreliability to
her whole statement.
THE COURT: Ms. Remal, you may respond.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, my response is that I think,

is one of the common - common aspects of human nature that when
people are angry, the behavior of yelling and cursing often
accompanies it.

It doesn't in every situation, there are some

people who, when they're angry sort of a slow burn and they
become quieter.

But I think that anger is most commonly

displayed by somebody yelling and screaming.

And so the fact

that you may not have met someone before and know what they're
normally like, that it's very appropriate to conclude that the
person is angry because of that kind of behavior, yelling and
screaming.
THE COURT:

Well, and I'm not sure that the emotion

of anger is what was contemplated by spontaneous utterance
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either.

I think, obviously, it's talking about strong emotion.

But anger can be something that is manipulated.

It's not like

spontaneous exclamation of some kind. And we're talking about
an hour and a half after the fact. And I think it's very
creative that you're saying that the action was his discovery
of the missing bag.

But the action, in fact, was what had

j

occurred around the table, and the defendant being arrested and |
the defendant taking responsibility for the bag, and that
occurred an hour and a half before.

j

Where was this person for
i

the hour and a half that he was gone?

j
i

MS. REMAL:

I have no more information than the Court j

now does.

I
I
THE COURT:

There is no closeness to the event,

j

really. And I can't find that there is a spontaneity - it

|

sounds like he took an hour and a half to come up with some

j

kind of - or at least potentially, he took an hour and a half
i
J
j

to think about this. And that's why timing of spontaneous
utterance is so important, and had worked out some kind of

!

statement.

I
I
Also, discovery of the missing bag is not necessarily j
i

what I would call a startling event.

I guess we'd need to do

research, which we haven't done. But generally missing
property is not considered a startling event.

It's something

!
i
|
i
I
i

of more consequence.
j
I am going to, based upon the totality, disallow her j
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statement about this individual and his alleged statement
because I do not believe it is inherently reliable.
one, Clay's full name is not even given.
attempt to find Clay.

Number

There has been no

And spontaneous utterances, despite the

fact that hearsay says the Rule 803 says very clearly,
unavailability is not essential, what one tries to do is put on
the best evidence.
is Clay?

The witness who made the statement. Where

We don't even have a last name. No effort has,

apparently, been made to find him.

We have a delay of an hour

and a half between the excitement - the excitement being the
arrest of the defendant, the acknowledgment by the defendant
that it was his bag.

The running away by this other individual

if you believe he existed.
time.

And that's not close enough in

I don't believe that his discovery of his missing bag,

if it was his bag, is what's relevant in terms of determining
the time factor.
If it was his bag, the other question that one would
ask if he were available for cross examination is, why didn't
you take it with you?
And I suppose, since I have already ruled, that Ms.
Wissler may not go into, in any definitive way, the contents of
the bag, and the defendant's statements about the contents of
the bag, other than the marijuana, it would be extremely
inequitable for me then to allow this witness, who had never
before in the hearings she appeared at, render statements to
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law enforcement, mention this other individual.

It would be

extremely inequitable for me to say, no you can't talk about
what the defendant said was in the bag indicating his
familiarity with the bag and his ownership.

All you can do is

go into what this other person who has no name said.
If we had a last name, if we knew that this was a
real person.

If, for example, this were a friend of the

defendant, who had left the jurisdiction and couldn't be found,
I'd be more inclined to let it in because we have inherent
reliability, or at least arguably that would be present in the
friendship between the two.

And the fact that we have a full

name and it's not just somebody pulled out of the air.
have nothing.

We don't know if this person existed;

But we

who they

were, where they got their information, and the very important
rights to confront and cross examine, which are not limited to
the defendant.

But the State has a right to see witnesses that

are given testimony.
precluded.

That's the reason why hearsay is

And to cross examine is precluded.

And this is an

extremely important thing, and it's coming out - I shouldn't
say thing, and extremely important piece of information - and
it's coming out at the last minute.

Meaning that it - the

State doesn't have an opportunity to rebut it, or in any way to
deal with it*

And all of those things are of concern to me.

So I find it is not a situation where we have a true
startling event.

If we do, the startling event is the removal
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1 < of the bag and the arrest of the defendant.
2

And that was not

proximate in time to this alleged statement made by this

3 I individual, Clay.
4 | reliability.

We do not have the standard indicia of

We don't even have a full name for the

5 I individual. And we don't really have an indication that it was
6 I a spontaneous utterance.
7

Part of that is the length of time

that has passed, an hour and a half. And part of it is that

8 I one can profess anger and scream and yell and that is not
9
10

necessarily a spontaneous emotional outburst.

It can be

premeditated and planned.

11

And if this information had been provided to the

12

State timely, I might be willing to bend over backwards to

13 I assist the defense in using this.

That is to say, in looking

14

more closely at allowing the State this opportunity.

But

15

there's been no chance for the State to have any kind of parity

16

here. And as I say, I've even made a ruling that the content

17 J of the bag, which the defendant was very familiar with, and
18

that's obviously very important to someone else's claiming to

19

own it.

20

I made a ruling that that could not come in.
So given the totality I'm not inclined to find - in

21 I fact, I find specifically that it is not a classic excited
22

utterance. And if it is, then it fails to come in because of

23

its lack of reliability.

24

a last name for the alleged declarant. And there is no other

25

indicia of reliability, specifically the defendant never said,

Specifically that we don't even have
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1

talked to Clay, or somebody else may own this that you ought to

2

talk to, or anything giving an indication that it was not his.

3

On the contrary, he not only accepted responsibility

4

for ownership and what the Court has found to be a non-coercive

5

setting, but he explained why he had it, giving and

6

explanation.

7

very clear about what else was in the bag.

8
9

And while the jury will never know this, he was

Now, I have no idea what is in Ms. Wissler's
briefcase on the bench.

No idea because it doesn't belong to

10

me and I have never looked at it.

11

know exactly what's in it.

But if it were mine, I'd

12

Do you want to speak with your client Ms. Remal -

13

MS. REMAL:

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay, I don't want to circumvent giving everybody the

Yes, thank you.
-and then say anything you wish to?

16

appropriate time they need.

Ms. Remal, if you need more, you

17

may have it.

18

you're ready then I'd like to move forward.

You can have as much time as you want.

But if

19

MS. REMAL:

I think we are ready, Your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

Do you...

21

MS. REMAL:

Mr. Allred is just reminding me of a

22

point that I think is probably obvious but none of us mentioned

23

which is, h* didn't know the name of Clay, he didn't know Clay,

24

he coulda/fc have given us information about how to find him.

25

And even if he did, we all know that realistically it's very
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difficult to get a person to come in as a witness and on the
witness stand admit that they've committed a crime, because
realistically people are not very inclined to do that.
THE COURT:

Realistically, why would someone accept

responsibility for ownership of the bag containing controlled
substances if the person who owns the thing is not even a
friend or someone whose last name you know.
Where does the sense of responsibility, or the sense
of a desire to help come from in that scenario?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, that's going to be the

subject of my closing argument.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Let's go ahead and

bring the jury - wait just a minute.
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor...

THE COURT:

Just a minute Chris. Where are the

instructions?

See how close we are on that.

Because you're

not going to call a rebuttal witness, are you?
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

Was that a question or a statement?

Well, it sounded like a statement but

it's a question.
MS. WISSLER:
THE COURT:

I'm not.
You may if you wish to.

MS. WISSLER:

No, I'm not.

THE COURT: Ms. Remal?
MS. REMAL:

I'm sorry, Your Honor, [inaudible] cover

306

